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Wood, Daniel H. - In: Games 13 (2022) 4, pp. 1-27

messages are more informative because there are fewer precise lies. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013367782

A complete analysis on the risk of using quantal response : when attacker maliciously changes behavior under uncertainty

Thanh Hong Nguyen; Yadav, Amulya - In: Games 13 (2022) 6, pp. 1-24

outcome and the attacker deception choice. Third, we conduct extensive experiments in various security game settings … defense strategy. This paper investigates the attacker's imitative behavior deception under uncertainty, in which the attacker … introduce a new maximin-based algorithm to compute a robust attacker deception decision under uncertainty, given the defender is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418201

Intention or request: The impact of message structures

Wang, Siyu; Flannery, Timothy - In: Games 12 (2021) 1, pp. 1-13

This paper investigates how different message structures impact communication strategy as well as sender and receiver behavior. Specifically, we focus on comparing communication games with messages stating an intention versus a request. Our experimental results show that when a game includes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200074

Intention or request : the impact of message structures

Wang, Siyu; Flannery, Timothy - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/12, pp. 1-13

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432600

Simple mediation in a cheap-talk game

Ganguly, Chirantan; Ray, Indrajit - In: Games 14 (2023) 3, pp. 1-14

In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of the N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of the N actions to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426261

Cheap talk with transparent and monotone motives from a seller to an informed buyer

Jung, Jeahan; Kim, Jeong-yoo - In: Games 15 (2024) 23, pp. 1-20

We develop a model of cheap talk with transparent and monotone motives from a seller to an informed buyer. By transparent and monotone motives, we mean that the seller's preference does not depend on the state of the world and is increasing in the choice(s) of the buyer regardless of the state...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636246

Information transmission and countervailing biases in organizations

Chiba, Saori - In: Games 15 (2024) 23, pp. 1-25

A decision maker (DM) must choose between two projects or decide on no project. The expected benefits of these projects are correlated. The DM seeks advice from an agent with private information about the projects' benefits. However, the agent's divergent preferences for projects and lack of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636248

Dynamic pricing decisions and seller-buyer interactions under capacity constraints

Mak, Vincent; Rapoport, Amnon; Gisches, Eyran J. - In: Games 9 (2018) 1, pp. 1-23

Focusing on sellers' pricing decisions and the ensuing seller-buyer interactions, we report an experiment on dynamic pricing with scarcity in the form of capacity constraints. Rational expectations equilibrium solutions are constructed and then tested experimentally with subjects assigned the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852727

Intention-based sharing

Di Cagno, Daniela; Galliera, Arianna; Güth, Werner; … - In: Games 9 (2018) 2, pp. 1-24

How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852738

Gender differences in yielding to social influence: An impunity experiment

Di Cagno, Daniela; Galliera, Arianna; Güth, Werner; … - In: Games 9 (2018) 4, pp. 1-12

In impunity games proposers, like allocators in dictator games, can take what they want; however, responders can refuse offers deemed unsatisfactory at own cost. We modify the impunity game via allowing offers to condition of another participant's counterfactual generosity intention. For a given...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227729