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I study the speed of the evolutionary process on small heterogeneous graphs using the Hawk-Dove game. The graphs are based on empirical observation data of grooming interactions in 81 primate groups. Analytic results for the star graph have revealed that irregular graphs can slow down the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682982
In this note we introduce different levels of decay in the Goyal, Galeotti and Kamphorst (GGK) insider-outsider model of network formation. First, we deal with situations where the amount of decay is sufficiently low to avoid superfluous connections in strict Nash networks and we examine the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008685286
We design an experiment to test how voters vote in a small committee election with three alternatives. Voters have common preferences that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal prior to the election and then casts a vote. The alternative with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227765
Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227796
decreases in the players' heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200180
Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709873
In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players' shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709893
In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players’ shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550537
Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453120
decreases in the players' heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172435