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Hiller, Tobias - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/48, pp. 1-10

In this article, we analyze the stability of couples on the marriage market. Recent developments in cooperative game … theory allow a new model that uses team games which make it possible to model the marriage market. Coalition structures can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891127

A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability

Montero, María - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 39-56

This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316670

Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R. - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-16

We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453256

Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities

Sağlam, İsmail - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 106-124

In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of … of each potential marriage decides whether to marry or to remain single at the beginning of the first period. Individuals … whether to stay married or to unilaterally divorce. We show that, for any society, there exist matching environments where the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754874

Delay to deal : bargaining with indivisibility and round-dependent transfer

Fan, Jijian - In: Games 14 (2023) 5, pp. 1-8

We examine a bargaining game in which players cannot make arbitrary offers. Instead, players alternately decide whether to accept or delay, and are rewarded with an indivisible portion and a perishable transfer that depends on the round. Our analysis demonstrates that when the initial transfer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426519

Stability and median rationalizability for aggregate matchings

Echenique, Federico; Lee, SangMok; Shum, Matthew; … - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-15

lattice. Aggregate matchings are relevant as matching data in revealed preference theory. We present a result on rationalizing … a matching data as the median stable matching. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503794

Invariant equilibrium in discontinuous bayesian games

Allison, Blake A.; Lepore, Jason J. - In: Games 15 (2024) 3, pp. 1-14

We provide sufficient conditions on the primitives of a class of discontinuous Bayesian games such that all games in the class share equilibria. If a Bayesian game in the class also satisfies a weak efficiency condition, then we show its normal form is better-reply secure. The invariance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636250

Countervailing conflicts of interest in delegation games

Chiba, Saori; Leong, Kaiwen - In: Games 14 (2023) 6, pp. 1-20

In this paper, we investigate optimal delegation mechanisms in the presence of countervailing conflicts of interest in the context of principal-agent problems. We introduce two dimensions of conflict of interest-pandering incentives related to the outside option and project biases. We compare...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014443303

An equilibrium analysis of Knaster’s fair division procedure

Van Essen, Matthew - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 21-37

In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948)). This procedure was designed to efficiently and fairly allocate multiple indivisible items when participants report their valuations truthfully. In equilibrium, players do not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753712

The seawall bargaining game

Delille, Rémy; Pereau, Jean-Christophe - In: Games 5 (2014) 2, pp. 127-139

Agents located from downstream to upstream along an estuary and exposed to a flooding risk have to invest in facilities like a seawall (or dike). As the benefits of that local public good increase along the estuary, upstream agents have to bargain for monetary compensation with the most...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010417140