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A tale of two bargaining solutions
Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 161-174
We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point, and tempered aspirations point), where the disagreement point and the utility possibilities frontier are endogenously determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316643
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Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs : a partition function approach
Abe, Takaaki - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/14, pp. 1-16
In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is "moderate", then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432603
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From bargaining solutions to claims rules: A proportional approach
Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel; Osório, António; … - In: Games 6 (2015) 1, pp. 32-38
Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709839
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A tale of two bargaining solutions
Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 161-174
We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point, and tempered aspirations point), where the disagreement point and the utility possibilities frontier are endogenously determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709845
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From bargaining solutions to claims rules : a proportional approach
Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel; Osório, António; … - In: Games 6 (2015) 1, pp. 32-38
Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503395
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From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach
Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel; Osório, António; … - In: Games 6 (2015) 1, pp. 32-38
Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011194439
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Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem
Duggan, Joseph E. - In: Games 11 (2020) 1, pp. 1-13
The Stable Fixtures problem (Irving and Scott (2007)) is a generalized matching model that nests the well-known Stable Roommates, Stable Marriage, and College Admissions problems as special cases. This paper extends a result of the Stable Roommates problem to demonstrate that a class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227804
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Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: A partition function approach
Abe, Takaaki - In: Games 12 (2021) 1, pp. 1-16
In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is "moderate", then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200076
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Horizon-K farsightedness in criminal networks
Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; … - In: Games 12 (2021) 3, pp. 1-13
We study the criminal networks that will emerge in the long run when criminals are neither myopic nor completely farsighted but have some limited degree of farsightedness. We adopt the horizon-K farsighted set to answer this question. We find that in criminal networks with n criminals, the set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200118
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Structural stability of coalitions: A formal model highlighting the role of participants positioned between members and neutral actors
Monsuur, Herman; Janssen, René - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-12
Given a fixed network that links various actors, we introduce a formal model that describes the structural stability of … formulated three assumptions that may be used to characterize the stability of this partition. We paid particular attention to …) illustrate the verification of the stability of a coalition, (2) provide existence results of stable coalitions, and (3) set the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200173