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Mayer, Alexander; Napel, Stefan - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-17

Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698221

An experimental study of strategic voting and accuracy of verdicts with sequential and simultaneous voting

Anderson, Lisa R.; Holt, Charles A.; Sieberg, Katri K.; … - In: Games 13 (2022) 2, pp. 1-29

In a model of simultaneous voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) consider the possibility that jurors vote … that those unintuitive predictions also hold with sequential voting. In this paper, we report paired experiments with … sequential and simultaneous voting under unanimity and majority rule. Observed behavior varies significantly depending on whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172468

Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining

Kohler, Stefan - In: Games 3 (2012) 3, pp. 119-137

Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754119

Strategic voting in heterogeneous electorates: an experimental study

Tyszler, Marcelo; Schram, Arthur - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 624-647

strategic voting in our experiment compared to the homogenous preference case that we study in a companion paper. Both …We study strategic voting in a setting where voters choose from three options and Condorcet cycles may occur. We … theoretically and empirically (with data collected in a laboratory experiment), the main comparative static results obtained for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240827

Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions

Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio - In: Games 7 (2016) 4, pp. 1-19

In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550604

Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms : a survey

Peleg, Bezalel; Holzman, Ron - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-17

We survey the results on representations of committees and constitutions by game forms that possess some kind of equilibrium strategies for each profile of preferences of the players. The survey is restricted to discrete models, that is, we deal with finitely many players and alternatives. No...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771308

Examining monotonicity and saliency using level-k reasoning in a voting game

Bassi, Anna; Williams, Kenneth C. - In: Games 5 (2014) 1, pp. 26-52

This paper presents an experiment that evaluates the effect of financial incentives and complexity in political science … voting experiments. To evaluate the effect of complexity we adopt a level-k reasoning model concept. This model by Nagel [1 …, increasing payoff amounts does promote more strategic behavior in a significant manner. Our results show with complex voting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010242048

Signalling, information and consumer fraud

Martinez-Gorricho, Silvia - In: Games 11 (2020) 3/29, pp. 1-25

In a two-sided asymmetric information market, the role of the accuracy of consumers' imperfect and private information on the level of fraud, incidence of fraud and trade under price rigidity is examined. Consumers receive a costless but noisy private signal of quality. The product offered in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432128

A scent of lemon-seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation

Voorneveld, Mark; Weibull, Jörgen W. - In: Games 2 (2011) 1, pp. 163-186

We consider a market for lemons in which the seller is a monopolistic price setter and the buyer receives a private noisy signal of the product’s quality. We model this as a game and analyze perfect Bayesian equilibrium prices, trading probabilities and gains of trade. In particular, we vary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752430

The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting

Bánnikova, Marina; Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel - In: Games 13 (2022) 6, pp. 1-8

This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents' decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418159