Showing 1 - 8 of 8
We use an agent-based model to investigate the interdependent dynamics between individual agency and emergent socioeconomic structure, leading to institutional change in a generic way. Our model simulates the emergence and exit of institutional units, understood as generic governed social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030506
We use an agent-based model to investigate the interdependent dynamics between individual agency and emergent socioeconomic structure, leading to institutional change in a generic way. Our model simulates the emergence and exit of institutional units, understood as generic governed social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709834
This paper presents an experiment that evaluates the effect of financial incentives and complexity in political science … voting experiments. To evaluate the effect of complexity we adopt a level-k reasoning model concept. This model by Nagel [1 … complexity promotes the highest degree of level-k strategic reasoning in every payment treatment. Standard financial incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369371
Mastermind is a two players zero sum game of imperfect information. Starting with Erdos and Rényi (1963), its combinatorics have been studied to date by several authors, e.g., Knuth (1977), Chvátal (1983), Goodrich (2009). The first player, called 'codemaker', chooses a secret code and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852720
We use an agent-based model to investigate the interdependent dynamics between individual agency and emergent socioeconomic structure, leading to institutional change in a generic way. Our model simulates the emergence and exit of institutional units, understood as generic governed social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010417110
Mastermind is a two players zero sum game of imperfect information. Starting with Erdos and Rényi (1963), its combinatorics have been studied to date by several authors, e.g., Knuth (1977), Chvátal (1983), Goodrich (2009). The first player, called “codemaker”, chooses a secret code and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771356
This paper presents an experiment that evaluates the effect of financial incentives and complexity in political science … voting experiments. To evaluate the effect of complexity we adopt a level-k reasoning model concept. This model by Nagel [1 … complexity promotes the highest degree of level-k strategic reasoning in every payment treatment. Standard financial incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010242048
Subscription decision in the telecom market is quite complex and cumbersome, invoking decision inertia in consumers and resulting in suboptimal choices. We implemented choice inertia and consumer interaction as an agent-based model to better understand the process. The model illustrates that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013367758