The experimental evidence on contests often reports overspending of contest participants compared to the theoretical … Nash equilibrium outcome. We show that a standard level-k model may rationalize overspending in contests. This result … complements the existing literature on overspending in contests, and it bridges an open gap between the contest and auction …

We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite number of heterogeneous …

an agreement that incorporates the (unrealized) costs of delay and conflict. A laboratory experiment has been used to … on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of the degree of power asymmetry. Indeed, there is no delay in reaching … investigate the effects of power asymmetries on conflict rates in a two-stage bargaining game that is (if necessary) followed by …

We study three triggers of conflict and explore their resultant emotional reactions in a laboratory experiment …. Economists suggest that the primary trigger of conflict is monetary incentives. Social psychologists suggest that conflicts are … that conflict originates from all three triggers. The three triggers differently impact the frequency of conflict, but not …

Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within …-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the …-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the …

A game-theoretic model of repeated interaction between two potential adversaries is analyzed to illustrate how conflict … players. During each period, each adversary must decide to either stage an attack or not. Conflict ensues if either player … period of tranquility. When this happens, it is as if conflict has suddenly arisen without any apparent cause or impetus …

Focusing on sellers’ pricing decisions and the ensuing seller-buyer interactions, we report an experiment on dynamic … deviations from equilibrium benchmarks on both sides of the market. Specifically, in our experiment the sellers are boundedly …

advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a …, rent dissipation in the two-stage conflict is equal across party whether or not an individual obtains first-stage momentum … more rent-dissipative than innate/uncontestable advantage. Therefore, Pyrrhic victories should be more common for contests …