produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable … counterterror coalition, holding the choices of all other nations as given. The incentives to join the coalition are the group …-specific benefits from retaliation enjoyed by each coalition member, the relatively lower spillover benefit from retaliation enjoyed by …

together rather than investing separately. We study the coordination and cooperation problems that might hinder successful … collaboration in a dynamic network setting. We develop an experiment in which coordination problems are mainly due to finding … collaborate. The results show that as costs of forming links increase, groups succeed less often in solving the coordination …

This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds …

We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by … the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided …

recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the … general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any …

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p … belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if … there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in …