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Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships
Deer, Lachlan; Bayer, Ralph-C. - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-16
We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously … findings show that pledges of commitment alone can increase cooperation and welfare in committed partnerships. The introduction … partnerships fall solely on the individual choosing to break up, pledges of commitment fail to improve cooperation and welfare. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453248
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Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers
Cox, Caleb A.; Stoddard, Brock - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 394-412
cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability … of cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383730
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Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers
Cox, Caleb A.; Stoddard, Brock - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 394-412
cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability … of cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709858
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Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships
Deer, Lachlan; Bayer, Ralph-C. - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-16
We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously … findings show that pledges of commitment alone can increase cooperation and welfare in committed partnerships. The introduction … partnerships fall solely on the individual choosing to break up, pledges of commitment fail to improve cooperation and welfare. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709878
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Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: Experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule
Funaki, Yukihiko; Li, Jiawen; Veszteg, Róbert F. - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-22
We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852718
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To tender or not to tender? Deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game
Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1-28
In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227697
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Dynamic contributions to a public project: The impact of rising marginal benefit and completion benefits
Baker, Ronald J.; Halloran, Matthew - In: Games 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1-19
contributions and condition additional contributions on the cooperation of others. This study presents results from experiments in …, completion benefits are shown to strongly encourage additional cooperation and project completion. Finally, projects are more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227699
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Anger management: Aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods
Gee, Laura K.; Lyu, Xinxin; Urry, Heather - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-28
The ability to punish free-riders can increase the provision of public goods. However, sometimes, the benefit of increased public good provision is outweighed by the costs of punishments. One reason a group may punish to the point that net welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709915
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Dynamic contributions to a public project : the impact of rising marginal benefit and completion benefits
Baker, Ronald J.; Halloran, Matthew - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/43, pp. 1-19
contributions and condition additional contributions on the cooperation of others. This study presents results from experiments in …, completion benefits are shown to strongly encourage additional cooperation and project completion. Finally, projects are more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891191
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To tender or not to tender? : deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game
Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/41, pp. 1-28
In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891197