We conduct a laboratory experiment where groups of 4 subjects constrained to obtain at most one good each, sequentially … bid for three goods in first and second price auctions. Subjects learn at the beginning of each auction their valuation … for the good and exit the auction once they have obtained one good. We show that, contrary to equilibrium predictions …

With a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of buy-options and the corresponding buy-price on revenues and …-prices, bidders are reluctant to bid above the option price (even though the option is no longer available once an auction has started …

than their own, and bidders with a higher value underbid to reciprocate the spiteful overbidding of the lower value bidders … overbid more than higher value bidders, and they overbid more frequently in the second price auction than in the ascending … price auction. Overall, the lower value bidder submits bids that exceed value about half the time. These patterns are not …

We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we … randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction … to a session-specific Nash equilibrium, and auction prices emerge supporting this equilibrium by the principle of forward …

Two experimental treatments are used to study the effects of auction risk across five mechanisms. The first canonical …, baseline treatment features only strategic risk and replicates the standard results that overbidding relative to the risk … neutral Nash equilibrium is prevalent in all common auction mechanisms except for the English auction. We do not find evidence …

In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948 …