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Countervailing conflicts of interest in delegation games
Chiba, Saori; Leong, Kaiwen - In: Games 14 (2023) 6, pp. 1-20
In this paper, we investigate optimal delegation mechanisms in the presence of countervailing conflicts of interest in … to the outside option and project biases. We compare three delegation mechanisms: full delegation, veto-based delegation …, and communication (no delegation). Contrary to conventional one-dimensional conflict models, our findings reveal a non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014443303
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Multidimensional screening with complementary activities : regulating a monopolist with unknown cost and unknown preference for empire building
Borges, Ana Pinto; Laussel, Didier; Correia-da-Silva, João - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 532-560
We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information, but actual cost (the difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240853
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A scent of lemon-seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
Voorneveld, Mark; Weibull, Jörgen W. - In: Games 2 (2011) 1, pp. 163-186
We consider a market for lemons in which the seller is a monopolistic price setter and the buyer receives a private noisy signal of the product’s quality. We model this as a game and analyze perfect Bayesian equilibrium prices, trading probabilities and gains of trade. In particular, we vary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752430
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Signalling, information and consumer fraud
Martinez-Gorricho, Silvia - In: Games 11 (2020) 3/29, pp. 1-25
In a two-sided asymmetric information market, the role of the accuracy of consumers' imperfect and private information on the level of fraud, incidence of fraud and trade under price rigidity is examined. Consumers receive a costless but noisy private signal of quality. The product offered in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432128
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The intuition of punishment : a study of fairness preferences and cognitive ability
Seier, Markus - In: Games 11 (2020) 2/21, pp. 1-25
Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431890
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Communication-enhancing vagueness
Wood, Daniel H. - In: Games 13 (2022) 4, pp. 1-27
I experimentally investigate how vague language changes the nature of communication in a biased strategic information transmission game. Counterintuitively, when both precise and imprecise messages can be sent, in aggregate, senders are more accurate, and receivers trust them more than when only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013367782
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Asymmetric reimbursement and contingent fees in environmental conflicts : observable vs. unobservable contracts
Park, Sung-Hoon; Settle, Chad E. - In: Games 14 (2023) 4, pp. 1-9
We investigate the impact of observability of contracts between a plaintiff and his attorney on both the efficiency of the environmental conflict and the fairness of the resulting outcome from the environmental conflict. By including two specific game-theoretic models (an observable-contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426341
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The dynamics of costly signaling
Wagner, Elliott O. - In: Games 4 (2013) 2, pp. 163-181
Costly signaling is a mechanism through which the honesty of signals can be secured in equilibrium, even in … interactions where communicators have conflicting interests. This paper explores the dynamics of one such signaling game: Spence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754763
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The emotional moves of a rational actor : smiles, scowls, and other credible messages
Reed, Lawrence Ian; DeScioli, Peter - In: Games 8 (2017) 2, pp. 1-11
Many scholars turn to emotions to understand irrational behavior. We do the opposite: we turn to rationality and game theory to understand people’s emotions. We discuss a striking theory of emotions that began with the game theory of credible threats and promises, then was enriched by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011708873
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Consciously uncertain : a Bayesian analysis of preferences formation
Stimolo, Marco; Beraldo, Sergio; Capasso, Salvatore; … - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-20
We investigate experimentally whether players deliberately use irrelevant market cues to shape their evaluations of a traded item. We implement a repeated Vickrey median price selling auction of an unusual bad where players are informed on the market price and on the three lowest or highest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172017