Showing 1 - 10 of 460
In this paper, we investigate optimal delegation mechanisms in the presence of countervailing conflicts of interest in … to the outside option and project biases. We compare three delegation mechanisms: full delegation, veto-based delegation …, and communication (no delegation). Contrary to conventional one-dimensional conflict models, our findings reveal a non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014443303
Costly signaling is a mechanism through which the honesty of signals can be secured in equilibrium, even in … interactions where communicators have conflicting interests. This paper explores the dynamics of one such signaling game: Spence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754763
Many scholars turn to emotions to understand irrational behavior. We do the opposite: we turn to rationality and game theory to understand people’s emotions. We discuss a striking theory of emotions that began with the game theory of credible threats and promises, then was enriched by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011708873
youngsters about social norms. We show that this signaling role provides sufficient incentives to sustain costly punishing …-based mechanisms are fragile, since punishment is a more compelling signaling device (in a sense that we make precise). …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014968
We study the structure of the rest points of signaling games and their dynamic behavior under selection …-mutation dynamics by taking the case of three signals as our canonical example. Many rest points of the replicator dynamics of signaling … signaling game and show that all but the perturbed rest points close to strict Nash equilibria are dynamically unstable. This is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503400
We study an extended version of a sender-receiver signaling game-a context-signaling (CS) game that involves external … investigated CS game shows that ambiguous signaling strategies can achieve perfect information transfer and are evolutionarily … probability as non-ambiguous perfect signaling systems in multi-agent simulations under standard evolutionary dynamics. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172391
I experimentally investigate how vague language changes the nature of communication in a biased strategic information transmission game. Counterintuitively, when both precise and imprecise messages can be sent, in aggregate, senders are more accurate, and receivers trust them more than when only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013367782
In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848336
We consider a market for lemons in which the seller is a monopolistic price setter and the buyer receives a private noisy signal of the product’s quality. We model this as a game and analyze perfect Bayesian equilibrium prices, trading probabilities and gains of trade. In particular, we vary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752430
We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information, but actual cost (the difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240853