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Stable international environmental agreements : large coalitions that achieve little

Rauscher, Michael - In: Games 10 (2019) 4/47, pp. 1-7

A standard result of coalition formation games is that stable coalitions are very small if the coalition plays Nash vis-à-vis the rest of the world and if abatement costs are quadratic. It has been shown that larger coalitions and even the grand coalition are possible if the marginal abatement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167810

Ideal reactive equilibrium

Sadanand, Asha B. - In: Games 10 (2019) 2/19, pp. 1-18

Refinements of the Nash equilibrium have followed the strategy of extending the idea of subgame perfection to incomplete information games. This has been achieved by appropriately restricting beliefs at unreached information sets. Each new refinement gives stricter and more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061941

Games with adaptation and mitigation

Chritonenko, Natalija V.; Hritonenko, Victoria; … - In: Games 11 (2020) 4/60, pp. 1-16

on pollution mitigation and environmental adaptation. The optimal emission, adaptation, and mitigation investments are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432437

Centralized versus decentralized cleanup of river water pollution : an application to the Ganges

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.; Beladi, Hamid - In: Games 14 (2023) 5, pp. 1-12

We exploit the public good attributes of Ganges water pollution cleanup and theoretically analyze an aggregate economy … pollution cleanup in these two cities ought to be provided in a centralized or in a decentralized manner. We first determine the … compute the optimal amount of water pollution cleanup in the two cities in a decentralized regime in which spending on cleanup …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426713

Evolutionary inspection and corruption games

Katsikas, Stamatios; Kolokoltsov, Vassili; Yang, Wei - In: Games 7 (2016) 4, pp. 1-25

We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550602

Game of thrones : accommodating monetary policies in a monetary union

Blueschke, Dmitri; Neck, Reinhard - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/9, pp. 1-15

In this paper, we present an application of the dynamic tracking games framework to a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear three-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union to analyze the interactions between fiscal (governments) and monetary (common central bank) policy makers,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848391

Takeovers, freezeouts, and risk arbitrage

Gomes, Armando R. - In: Games 15 (2024) 1, pp. 1-27

This paper develops a dynamic model of tender offers in which there is trading on the target's shares during the takeover, and bidders can freeze out target shareholders (compulsorily acquire remaining shares not tendered at the bid price), features that prevail on almost all takeovers. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014480797

Selection-mutation dynamics of signaling games

Hofbauer, Josef; Huttegger, Simon M. - In: Games 6 (2015) 1, pp. 2-31

We study the structure of the rest points of signaling games and their dynamic behavior under selection-mutation dynamics by taking the case of three signals as our canonical example. Many rest points of the replicator dynamics of signaling games are not isolated and, therefore, not robust under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503400

Formation of stable and efficient social storage cloud

Mane, Pramod C.; Krishnamurthy, Nagarajan; Ahuja, Kapil - In: Games 10 (2019) 4/44, pp. 1-17

, we analyze which networks are pairwise stable and efficient. We show that for the proposed utility function, there always … exists a pairwise stable network, which is also efficient. We show that all pairwise stable networks are efficient, and hence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167820

Nonspecific networking

Durieu, Jacques; Haller, Hans; Solal, Philippe - In: Games 2 (2011) 1, pp. 87-113

A new model of strategic networking is developed and analyzed, where an agent’s investment in links is nonspecific. The model comprises a large class of games which are both potential and super- or submodular games. We obtain comparative statics results for Nash equilibria with respect to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752433

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