In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices...

In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices...

Ortner et al. (Manage. Account. Res. 36(1):43-50, 2017) propose the State-Contingent Relative Benefit Cost Allocation Scheme as an incentive system for risky investment decisions. The note at hand reveals the information distribution implicitly assumed within the framework of this study. Based...

I address the comments made by Ortner (Games 9(4): 93, 2018) in relation to my note 'Incentive Systems for Risky Investment Decisions Under Unknown Preferences: Ortner et al. Revisited' (Games 9(2): 26, 2018).

I address the comments made by Ortner (Games 9(4): 93, 2018) in relation to my note “Incentive Systems for Risky Investment Decisions Under Unknown Preferences: Ortner et al. Revisited” (Games 9(2): 26, 2018).

Ortner et al. (Manage. Account. Res. 36(1):43–50, 2017) propose the State-Contingent Relative Benefit Cost Allocation Scheme as an incentive system for risky investment decisions. The note at hand reveals the information distribution implicitly assumed within the framework of this study. Based...

We study network formation with n players and link cost » 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player ν incorporates the expected number of players to which ν will become disconnected. We focus on...

We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration in a series of...

We study network formation with n players and link cost α 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player ν incorporates the expected number of players to which ν will become disconnected. We focus on...

We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration in a series of...