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Assortative matching by lottery contests

Cohen, Chen; Rabi, Ishay; Sela, Aner - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-20

We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite number of heterogeneous agents with commonly known types. The agents in each set compete in a lottery (Tullock) contest, and then are assortatively matched, namely, the winner of set A is matched with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418053

To tender or not to tender? : deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game

Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/41, pp. 1-28

In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891197

Communication, expectations, and trust : an experiment with three media

Abatayo, Anna Lou; Lynham, John; Sherstyuk, Katerina - In: Games 11 (2020) 4/48, pp. 1-26

We studied how communication media affect trust game play. Three popular media were considered: traditional face …-to-face, Facebook groups, and anonymous online chat. We considered post-communication changes in players' expectations and preferences …, and further analyzed the contents of group communications to understand the channels though which communication appears to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432337

The impact of the irrelevant : temporary buy-options and bidding behavior in auctions

Peeters, Ronald; Strobel, Martin; Vermeulen, Dries; … - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-19

With a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of buy-options and the corresponding buy-price on revenues and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453215

Informational hold up and intermediaries

Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14

Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049

Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences

Shinozaki, Hiroki - In: Games 13 (2022) 6, pp. 1-24

We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous objects to agents with money, where the number of agents exceeds that of objects. Each agent can receive at most one object, and some objects may remain unallocated. A bundle is a pair consisting of an object and a payment. An agent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418154

Intention or request : the impact of message structures

Wang, Siyu; Flannery, Timothy - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/12, pp. 1-13

This paper investigates how different message structures impact communication strategy as well as sender and receiver … behavior. Specifically, we focus on comparing communication games with messages stating an intention versus a request. Our …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432600

Spite and reciprocity in auctions

Nishimura, Naoko; Cason, Timothy N.; Saijō, Tatsuyoshi; … - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 365-411

The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752417

Bimodal bidding in experimental all-pay auctions

Ernst, Christiane; Thöni, Christian - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 608-623

We report results from experimental first-price, sealed-bid, all-pay auctions for a good with a common and known value. We observe bidding strategies in groups of two and three bidders and under two extreme information conditions. As predicted by the Nash equilibrium, subjects use mixed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240829

Learning to set the reserve price optimally in laboratory first price auctions

Banerjee, Priyodorshi; Khare, Shashwat; Srikant, P. - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/79, pp. 1-16

We analyze choices of sellers, each setting a reserve price in a laboratory first price auction with automated equilibrium bidding. Subjects are allowed to gain experience for a fixed period of time prior to making a single payoff-relevant choice. Behavior of more experienced sellers was...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011993277

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