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Optimal incentives schemes under homo moralis preferences

Sarkisian, Roberto - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/28, pp. 1-22

This study focuses on the optimal incentive schemes in a multi-agent moral hazard model, where each agent has other-regarding preferences and an individual measure of output, with both being observable by the principal. In particular, the two agents display homo moralis preferences. I find that,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012493322

The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent

Maréchal, François; Thomas, Lionel - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/12, pp. 1-22

satisfy because of the different kinds of incentives to be managed and the overall trade-off between rent extraction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849217

Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology

Marini, Marco; Polidori, Paolo; Teobaldelli, Désirée; … - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/6, pp. 1-13

One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk … obtain that lower agent’s risk aversion unambiguously leads to higher incentives when the technology function linking …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848346

Vertical relationships with hidden interactions

Kim, Jaesoo; Shin, Dongsoo - In: Games 14 (2023) 6, pp. 1-21

environments while removing sabotaging incentives at no cost once collusion is deterred. As a result, the cooperative structure can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014443301

Team incentives under moral and altruistic preferences : wich team to choose?

Sarkisian, Roberto - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-24

This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences, i.e., their … incentives decreases with the degrees of morality and altruism displayed by the agents, thus leading to increased profits for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771132

The optimality of team contracts

Barlo, Mehmet; Özdoğan, Ayça - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 670-689

This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe and verify each others’ effort levels and draft enforceable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240825

Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions

Chen, Ying-Ju; Zhao, Xiaojian - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 508-531

In numerous economic scenarios, contracting parties may not have a clear picture of all the relevant aspects. A contracting party may be unaware of what she and/or others are entitled to determine. Therefore, she may reject a contract that is too good to be true. Further, a contracting party may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240861

Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games : bigger is not necessarily better

Pulford, Briony D.; Colman, Andrew M.; Loomes, Graham - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/4, pp. 1-10

In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their …-form games under task-related incentives of conventional magnitude and compared them with choices and reasons in the same games … under incentives five times as large. Both strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices were almost …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848336

Quantile stable mechanisms

Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. … - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-9

We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms - quantile stable mechanisms - that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547697

Salience bias and overwork

Römeis, Fabio; Herweg, Fabian; Müller, Daniel - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-22

necessarily provide insufficient incentives that result in inefficiently low effort but instead may well provide excessive … incentives that result in inefficiently high effort. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172380

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