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Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC : null player or not?
Mayer, Alexander - In: Games 9 (2018) 2/29, pp. 1-12
Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as “null players”. Luxembourg’s role in the Council of Ministers during the first period of the European Economic Community (EEC) is often cited as a real-world case. The paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849529
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The integer nucleolus of directed simple games : a characterization and an algorithm
Wolff, Reiner - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-12
We study the class of directed simple games, assuming that only integer solutions are admitted; i.e., the players share a resource that comes in discrete units. We show that the integer nucleolus-if nonempty-of such a game is composed of the images of a particular payoff vector under all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621467
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From bargaining solutions to claims rules : a proportional approach
Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel; Osório, António; … - In: Games 6 (2015) 1, pp. 32-38
Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503395
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Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games : bigger is not necessarily better
Pulford, Briony D.; Colman, Andrew M.; Loomes, Graham - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/4, pp. 1-10
In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their …-form games under task-related incentives of conventional magnitude and compared them with choices and reasons in the same games … under incentives five times as large. Both strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices were almost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848336
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Balanced weights and three-sided coalition formation
Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Dimitrov, Dinko - In: Games 1 (2010) 2, pp. 159-167
the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751376
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Universally balanced combinatorial optimization games
Demange, Gabrielle; Deng, Xiaotie - In: Games 1 (2010) 3, pp. 299-316
requirement reflects some forms of indivisibility. We are interested in the classes of games that guarantee a non-empty core no …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751967
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A note on the core of TU-cooperative games with multiple membership externalities
Nax, Heinrich H. - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 191-203
-298) is proposed to allow for multiple membership. The definition of the core is adapted analogously and the possibilities for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010422383
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On the stability of couples
Hiller, Tobias - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/48, pp. 1-10
In this article, we analyze the stability of couples on the marriage market. Recent developments in cooperative game theory allow a new model that uses team games which make it possible to model the marriage market. Coalition structures can model couples. We analyze two cases: a symmetrical one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891127
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To tender or not to tender? : deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game
Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/41, pp. 1-28
In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891197
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Training, abilities and the structure of teams
Hiller, Tobias - In: Games 14 (2023) 3, pp. 1-8
Training in firms has an effect on the productivity of employees who receive the training, and depending on the production technology, on the other employees as well. Meanwhile, changing the remuneration structure within a team can change the stability of a team. In this paper, we apply the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426257