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Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games : bigger is not necessarily better

Pulford, Briony D.; Colman, Andrew M.; Loomes, Graham - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/4, pp. 1-10

In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their …-form games under task-related incentives of conventional magnitude and compared them with choices and reasons in the same games … under incentives five times as large. Both strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices were almost …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848336

Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC : null player or not?

Mayer, Alexander - In: Games 9 (2018) 2/29, pp. 1-12

Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as “null players”. Luxembourg’s role in the Council of Ministers during the first period of the European Economic Community (EEC) is often cited as a real-world case. The paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849529

The integer nucleolus of directed simple games : a characterization and an algorithm

Wolff, Reiner - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-12

We study the class of directed simple games, assuming that only integer solutions are admitted; i.e., the players share a resource that comes in discrete units. We show that the integer nucleolus-if nonempty-of such a game is composed of the images of a particular payoff vector under all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621467

Quantile stable mechanisms

Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. … - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-9

We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms - quantile stable mechanisms - that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547697

Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC: Null player or not?

Mayer, Alexander - In: Games 9 (2018) 2, pp. 1-12

Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as 'null players'. Luxembourg's role in the Council of Ministers during the first period of the European Economic Community (EEC) is often cited as a real-world case. The paper contrasts the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852745

Simple voting games and cartel damage proportioning

Napel, Stefan; Welter, Dominik - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-18

Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their “relative responsibility for the harm caused” according to EU legislation. Several studies have argued that the theoretically best way to operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649687

An experiment on cooperation in a CPR game with a disapproval option

Yao, Koffi Serge William - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-14

This paper studies the standard version of the approval mechanism with two players in a common pool resource (CPR) extraction game. In the case of disapproval, the Nash extraction level is implemented. The paper investigates, experimentally, the extent to which the Nash threat leads to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012650460

Dynamic programming for computing power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions

Staudacher, Jochen; Wagner, Felix; Filipp, Jan - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-17

We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions amongst subsets of players (reflecting, e.g., ideological proximity) using the paradigm of dynamic programming. Starting from the state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171847

Weighted scoring committees

Mayer, Alexander; Napel, Stefan - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-17

Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698221

On the stability of couples

Hiller, Tobias - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/48, pp. 1-10

In this article, we analyze the stability of couples on the marriage market. Recent developments in cooperative game theory allow a new model that uses team games which make it possible to model the marriage market. Coalition structures can model couples. We analyze two cases: a symmetrical one...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891127

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