Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 71
Cover Image
Deterrence by collective punishment may work against criminals but never against freedom fighters
Bolle, Friedel - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-15
The main goal of collective punishment (CP) is the deterrence of future "wrong-doing" by freedom fighters or terrorists …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547679
Cover Image
Horizon-K farsightedness in criminal networks
Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; … - In: Games 12 (2021) 3, pp. 1-13
We study the criminal networks that will emerge in the long run when criminals are neither myopic nor completely farsighted but have some limited degree of farsightedness. We adopt the horizon-K farsighted set to answer this question. We find that in criminal networks with n criminals, the set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591503
Cover Image
Should law keep pace with society? : relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods
Roithmayr, Daria; Isakov, Alexander; Rand, David - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 124-149
punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional … punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the ability to control how quickly legal rules of punishment evolve relative to … social behavior that legal punishment regulates. However, at what rate should legal rules evolve relative to society to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316651
Cover Image
Anger management : aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods
Gee, Laura K.; Lyu, Xinxin; Urry, Heather - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-28
welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger about free-riding. If this is the case, then tools that regulate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621328
Cover Image
The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game : some experimental evidence
Chaudhuri, Ananish; Paichayontvijit, Tirnud; Sbai, Erwann - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-24
the use of loaded language significantly reduces the incidence of bribery and increases the level of punishment …. Punishment of bribery leads to reduced bribery in future. The evidence suggests that this game captures essential features of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515620
Cover Image
Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods
Roithmayr, Daria; Isakov, Alexander; Rand, David - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 124-149
punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional … punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the ability to control how quickly legal rules of punishment evolve relative to … social behavior that legal punishment regulates. However, at what rate should legal rules evolve relative to society to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709843
Cover Image
Anger management: Aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods
Gee, Laura K.; Lyu, Xinxin; Urry, Heather - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-28
welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger about free-riding. If this is the case, then tools that regulate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709915
Cover Image
The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game: Some experimental evidence
Chaudhuri, Ananish; Paichayontvijit, Tirnud; Sbai, Erwann - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-24
the use of loaded language significantly reduces the incidence of bribery and increases the level of punishment …. Punishment of bribery leads to reduced bribery in future. The evidence suggests that this game captures essential features of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709882
Cover Image
Punishment, cooperation, and cheater detection in "noisy" social exchange
Bornstein, Gary; Weisel, Ori - In: Games 1 (2010) 1, pp. 18-33
information conditions, where cheating is less obvious, punishment is much less effective in enforcing cooperation. Evidently, the … explanatory power of punishment is constrained by the visibility of cheating. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751389
Cover Image
Punishment strategies across societies : conventional wisdoms reconsidered
Suleiman, Ramzi; Samid, Yuval - In: Games 12 (2021) 3, pp. 1-23
Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes … cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where … antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012607461