The paper studies bargaining games involving players with present-biased preferences. The paper shows that the relative timing of bargaining rewards and bargaining costs will determine whether the players' present-bias will affect bargaining outcomes. In cases where players agree to a bargain in...

This paper examines the idea that adherence to social rules is in part driven by moral emotions and the ability to recognize the emotions of others. Moral emotions like shame and guilt produce negative feelings when social rules are transgressed. The ability to recognize and understand the...

This paper examines the idea that adherence to social rules is in part driven by moral emotions and the ability to recognize the emotions of others. Moral emotions like shame and guilt produce negative feelings when social rules are transgressed. The ability to recognize and understand the...

In recent years, several high-profile incidents have spurred research into games of timing. A framework emanating from the FlipIt model features two covert agents competing to control a single contested resource. In its basic form, the resource exists forever while generating value at a constant...

Game and decision theory start from rather strong premises. Preferences, represented by utilities, beliefs represented by probabilities, common knowledge and symmetric rationality as background assumptions are treated as “given.” A richer language enabling us to capture the process leading...

Using the political-economic history of the development of telephony during the 1870s as a backdrop, this paper studies a two-player Tullock contest that includes both research effort (R&D) and legal effort (i.e., rent-seeking effort). The two types of efforts complement each other and...

This work aims to provide different perspectives on the relationships between cooperative game theory and the research field concerning climate change dynamics. New results are obtained in the framework of competitive bargaining solutions and related issues, moving from a cooperative approach to...

We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We conduct an economic experiment using this model to...

We experimentally investigate variants of the investment game by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), in which one of the two players decides who are first mover and second mover. It has been shown by Kleine, Königstein, and Rozsnyói (2014) that voluntary leadership increases both investment and...

In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players’ shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper,...