We exploit the public good attributes of Ganges water pollution cleanup and theoretically analyze an aggregate economy of two cities-Kanpur and Varanasi-through which the Ganges flows. Our specific objective is to study whether water pollution cleanup in these two cities ought to be provided in...

The present paper introduces a theoretical framework through which the degree of risk aversion with respect uncertain prices can be measured through the context of the indirect utility function (IUF) using a lab experiment. First, the paper introduces the main elements of the duality theory (DT)...

An evolutionary model of European football was applied to analyze a two-stage indirect evolution game in which teams choose their utility function in the first stage, and their optimal talent investments in the second stage. Given the second-stage optimal aggregate-taking strategy (ATS) of...

We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions...

This paper analyzes a reward system that uses a club good to promote recycling. In particular, we examine a context of incomplete information in which the administrator is unable to observe the resident's attitude towards recycling. The results suggest that despite the lack of information, the...

This paper analyzes a reward system that uses a club good to promote recycling. In particular, we examine a context of incomplete information in which the administrator is unable to observe the resident’s attitude towards recycling. The results suggest that despite the lack of information, the...

We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions...

An evolutionary model of European football was applied to analyze a two-stage indirect evolution game in which teams choose their utility function in the first stage, and their optimal talent investments in the second stage. Given the second-stage optimal aggregate-taking strategy (ATS) of...

Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and moralists. By altruists, we mean people who do not...

In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...