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Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity
Okada, Isamu; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Uchida, Satoshi - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/13, pp. 1-10
stern-judging rule adoption. Our analysis shows that the use of the rule helps to maintain cooperation if reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167923
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The evolution of reputation-based cooperation in regular networks
Sasaki, Tatsuya; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Okada, Isamu; … - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-16
Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affect human cooperation … selection and reputation-based reciprocity, theoretical study of the interplay between both mechanisms remains almost uncharted …. Here, we present a new individual-based model for the evolution of reciprocal cooperation between reputation and networks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621316
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Strategic information suppression in borrowing and pre-lending cognition : theory and evidence
Chen, Zhongwen; Zhao, Xiaojian - In: Games 14 (2023) 3, pp. 1-24
This paper theoretically studies the interaction between an informed borrower and an uninformed lender facing possible default of a loan application. The lender is motivated to invest cognitive resources before making a lending decision. If the regulatory fine is weak, it is impossible for a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422638
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Evolutionary game theory : a renaissance
Newton, Jonathan - In: Games 9 (2018) 2/31, pp. 1-67
Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849550
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Fairness and trust in structured populations
Tarnita, Corina E. - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 214-230
not affect the winning strategy. Further considering the effects of reputation and structure, I find that they act …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316592
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Ransomware and reputation
Cartwright, Anna; Cartwright, Edward - In: Games 10 (2019) 2/26, pp. 1-14
through reputation. We demonstrate that there are situations in which it is optimal for the criminal to always return the … files and situations in which it is not. We argue that the ability to build reputation will depend on how victims … they need to find ways of building a good reputation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061894
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Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo; Mantilla, César; Sethi, Rajiv - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 299-317
This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316535
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Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative Games
Attanasi, Giuseppe; García Gallego, Aurora; … - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 273-298
We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316539
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How moral codes evolve in a trust game
Rabanal, Jean Paul; Friedman, Daniel - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 150-160
This paper analyzes the dynamic stability of moral codes in a two population trust game. Guided by a moral code, members of one population, the Trustors, are willing to punish members of the other population, the Trustees, who defect. Under replicator dynamics, adherence to the moral code has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316645
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Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining
Kohler, Stefan - In: Games 3 (2012) 3, pp. 119-137
Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754119