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Against all odds : tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups
Schlangenotto, Darius; Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovič, … - In: Games 11 (2020) 3/31, pp. 1-24
When groups face difficult problems, the voices of experts may be lost in the noise of others' contributions. We present results from a "naturally noisy" setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the expert's voice was "lost" to such a degree that bringing forward even more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432144
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Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation : experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule
Funaki, Yukihiko; Li, Jiawen; Veszteg, Róbert F. - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-22
We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771301
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A condorcet jury theorem for large poisson elections with multiple alternatives
Goertz, Johanna M. M. - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/2, pp. 1-12
that the CJT holds for large elections with two alternatives, but there is also an example of a large election with three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168613
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Electoral competition with strategic disclosure
Bizzotto, Jacopo; Solow, Benjamin - In: Games 10 (2019) 3/29, pp. 1-17
Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy platforms by candidates. We find that when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062360
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Party formation and coalitional bargaining in a model of proportional representation
Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha; Oak, Mandar - In: Games 13 (2022) 4, pp. 1-17
We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where ideologically motivated citizen groups form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties' seat shares, the size of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013367780
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Coordination and cooperation problems in network good production
Knigge, Antonie; Buskens, Vincent Willem - In: Games 1 (2010) 3, pp. 357-380
collaboration in a dynamic network setting. We develop an experiment in which coordination problems are mainly due to finding … together rather than investing separately. We study the coordination and cooperation problems that might hinder successful … collaborate. The results show that as costs of forming links increase, groups succeed less often in solving the coordination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752455
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Evidential equilibria : heuristics and biases in static games of complete information
Al-Nowaihi, Ali; Dhami, Sanjit S. - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 637-676
Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it difficult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games, including the prisoner's dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011384070
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An adaptive learning model in coordination games
Funai, Naoki - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 648-669
In this paper, we provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in normal form games with strict Nash equilibria. In the model, each player assigns subjective payoff assessments to his own actions, where the assessment of each action is a weighted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240826
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Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game
Albrecht, Felix; Kube, Sebastian - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/54, pp. 1-13
We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891062
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Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships
Deer, Lachlan; Bayer, Ralph-C. - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-16
We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously-formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual's: (1) opportunity to commit to their partner; (2) the cost of dissolving committed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453248