Similar Search Results

An experiment on cooperation in a CPR game with a disapproval option

Yao, Koffi Serge William - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-14

This paper studies the standard version of the approval mechanism with two players in a common pool resource (CPR) extraction game. In the case of disapproval, the Nash extraction level is implemented. The paper investigates, experimentally, the extent to which the Nash threat leads to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012650460

External Pressure on Alliances: What Does the Prisoners’ Dilemma Reveal?

Binner, Jane M.; Fletcher, Leslie R.; Kolokoltsov, Vassili - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 754-775

Prompted by a real-life observation in the UK retail market, a two-player Prisoners’ Dilemma model of an alliance between two firms is adapted to include the response of a rival firm, resulting in a version of a three-player Prisoners’ Dilemma. We use this to analyse the impact on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010721530

The Dynamics of Costly Signaling

Wagner, Elliott O. - In: Games 4 (2013) 2, pp. 163-181

Costly signaling is a mechanism through which the honesty of signals can be secured in equilibrium, even in interactions where communicators have conflicting interests. This paper explores the dynamics of one such signaling game: Spence’s model of education. It is found that separating...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010641775

Introducing Disappointment Dynamics and Comparing Behaviors in Evolutionary Games: Some Simulation Results

Patokos, Tassos - In: Games 5 (2014) 1, pp. 1-25

The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a distinct type:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010736494

A Modal Logic of Epistemic Games

Lorini, Emiliano; Schwarzentruber, François - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 478-526

We propose some variants of a multi-modal of joint action, preference and knowledge that support reasoning about epistemic games in strategic form. The first part of the paper deals with games with complete information. We first provide syntactic proofs of some well-known theorems in the area of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008756382

(Un)Bounded Rationality in Decision Making and Game Theory – Back to Square One?

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - In: Games 1 (2010) 1, pp. 53-65

Game and decision theory start from rather strong premises. Preferences, represented by utilities, beliefs represented by probabilities, common knowledge and symmetric rationality as background assumptions are treated as “given.” A richer language enabling us to capture the process leading...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682985

Computer Solution to the Game of Pure Strategy

Rhoads, Glenn C.; Bartholdi, Laurent - In: Games 3 (2012) 4, pp. 150-156

We numerically solve the classical "Game of Pure Strategy" using linear programming. We notice an intricate even-odd behaviour in the results of our computations that seems to encourage odd or maximal bids.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030517

Schelling, von Neumann, and the Event that Didn’t Occur

Field, Alexander J. - In: Games 5 (2014) 1, pp. 53-89

Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030522

Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs : a partition function approach

Abe, Takaaki - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/14, pp. 1-16

In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is "moderate", then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432603

Self-enforcing collective counterterror retaliation

Oliveira, André L.; Silva, Emilson C. D. - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-16

produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable … counterterror coalition, holding the choices of all other nations as given. The incentives to join the coalition are the group …-specific benefits from retaliation enjoyed by each coalition member, the relatively lower spillover benefit from retaliation enjoyed by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171770

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last