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Do output-dependent prizes alleviate the sabotage problem in tournaments?

Glökler, Thomas; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-20

We investigate whether tournament prizes that depend on joint output ("variable prize tournaments") can alleviate the sabotage problem which is otherwise inherent in tournament struc- tures. In a game-theoretical model with three contestants, we compare fixed-prize tournaments with tournaments...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418051

Assortative matching by lottery contests

Cohen, Chen; Rabi, Ishay; Sela, Aner - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-20

We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite number of heterogeneous agents with commonly known types. The agents in each set compete in a lottery (Tullock) contest, and then are assortatively matched, namely, the winner of set A is matched with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418053

A choice prediction competition for a social preferences in simple extensive form games : an introduction

Ert, Eyal; Erev, Ido; Roth, Alvin E. - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 257-276

competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the …, and derive the predicted behavior as an output. The submission deadline is 1 December 2011, the results of the competition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752422

Consistent beliefs in extensive form games

Barelli, Paulo - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 415-421

We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752453

Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games and the impact on equilibrium selection

Shachat, Jason M.; Swarthout, J. Todd - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 738-753

We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240820

Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions

Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio - In: Games 7 (2016) 4, pp. 1-19

In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550604

Quantile stable mechanisms

Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. … - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-9

We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms - quantile stable mechanisms - that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547697

Optimal accuracy of unbiased tullock contests with two heterogeneous players

Sahm, Marco - In: Games 13 (2022) 2, pp. 1-6

I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner's expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172435

To tender or not to tender? : deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game

Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/41, pp. 1-28

In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891197

A choice prediction competition for market entry games : an introduction

Erev, Ido; Ert, Eyal; Roth, Alvin E. - In: Games 1 (2010) 2, pp. 117-136

A choice prediction competition is organized that focuses on decisions from experience in market entry games (http …://sites.google.com/site/gpredcomp/ and http://www.mdpi.com/si/games/predict-behavior/). The competition is based on two experiments: An estimation experiment …, and a competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751378

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