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Do output-dependent prizes alleviate the sabotage problem in tournaments?

Glökler, Thomas; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-20

We investigate whether tournament prizes that depend on joint output ("variable prize tournaments") can alleviate the sabotage problem which is otherwise inherent in tournament struc- tures. In a game-theoretical model with three contestants, we compare fixed-prize tournaments with tournaments...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418051

Analysis of the competition of the South-Eastern Railway of Peru through a timetable auction

Aliaga-Miranda, Augusto; Flores-Vilcapoma, Luis Ricardo; … - In: Games 16 (2025) 2, pp. 1-19

promote competition in railway transportation through timetable auctions and infrastructure access. However, the concession … has resulted in a vertically integrated structure that favors PeruRail, which faces minimal direct competition, controls … address these distortions, we propose reforming the auction mechanism to neutralize these advantages and enhance competition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015408245

Payoff shares in two-player contests

Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - In: Games 7 (2016) 3, pp. 1-7

In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players’ shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550537

Assortative matching by lottery contests

Cohen, Chen; Rabi, Ishay; Sela, Aner - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-20

We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite number of heterogeneous agents with commonly known types. The agents in each set compete in a lottery (Tullock) contest, and then are assortatively matched, namely, the winner of set A is matched with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418053

Formalizing opponent modeling with the rock, paper, scissors game

Brockbank, Erik; Vul, Edward - In: Games 12 (2021) 3, pp. 1-19

In simple dyadic games such as rock, paper, scissors (RPS), people exhibit peculiar sequential dependencies across repeated interactions with a stable opponent. These regularities seem to arise from a mutually adversarial process of trying to outwit their opponent. What underlies this process,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649176

A choice prediction competition for a social preferences in simple extensive form games : an introduction

Ert, Eyal; Erev, Ido; Roth, Alvin E. - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 257-276

competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the …, and derive the predicted behavior as an output. The submission deadline is 1 December 2011, the results of the competition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752422

Consistent beliefs in extensive form games

Barelli, Paulo - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 415-421

We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752453

Competitive centipede games : zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation

Krockow, Eva M.; Pulford, Briony D.; Colman, Andrew M. - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 262-272

Reciprocal cooperation can be studied in the Centipede game, in which two players alternate in choosing between a cooperative GO move and a non-cooperative STOP move. GO sustains the interaction and increases the player pair's total payoff while incurring a small personal cost; STOP terminates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316544

The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting

Bánnikova, Marina; Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel - In: Games 13 (2022) 6, pp. 1-8

This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents' decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418159

Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games and the impact on equilibrium selection

Shachat, Jason M.; Swarthout, J. Todd - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 738-753

We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240820