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On information aggregation and interim efficiency in networks

Jimenez-Martinez, Antonio - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-14

This paper considers a population of agents that are engaged in a listening network. The agents wish to match their actions to the true value of some uncertain (exogenous) parameter and to the actions of the other agents. Each agent begins with some initial information about the parameter and,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709923

On information aggregation and interim efficiency in networks

Jiménez-Martínez, Antonio - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-14

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621465

A model of competing gangs in networks

Poindron, Alexis; Allouch, Nizar - In: Games 15 (2024) 2, pp. 1-15

Two groups produce a network good perceived by a third party, such as a police or military institution, as a "public bad", referred to as "crime" for simplicity. These two groups, considered mafias, are assumed to be antagonists, whether they are enemies or competitors in the same market,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636243

To tender or not to tender? Deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game

Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1-28

contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this … especially for groups on the losing side of the contest: Given the same level of sunk costs, contributions to the public good are … lower for groups which failed to be successful in the preceding between-group contest. Furthermore, this detrimental effect …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227697

A game theoretic model of adversaries and media manipulation

Hausken, Kjell - In: Games 10 (2019) 4, pp. 1-15

strength of reward or punishment, time discount parameter, early evidence, full evidence, contest intensity, and evidence ratio …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227793

To tender or not to tender? : deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game

Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/41, pp. 1-28

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891197

A game theoretic model of adversaries and media manipulation

Hausken, Kjell - In: Games 10 (2019) 4/48, pp. 1-15

strength of reward or punishment, time discount parameter, early evidence, full evidence, contest intensity, and evidence ratio …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167778

Equivalent modes of reimbursement in augmented contests

Cohen, Chen; Darioshi, Roy; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - In: Games 14 (2023) 2, pp. 1-6

This article presents an equivalence theorem in the context of Tullock's augmented lottery contest with external or … the augmented contest is vulnerable to framing biases, it is strategically neutral. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422484

The refugee game : the relationship between individual security expenditures and collective security

Faria, João Ricardo; Novak, Andreas J.; Bagchi, Aniruddha - In: Games 11 (2020) 2/24, pp. 1-13

This paper studies a three player hierarchical differential game (with a large country, a small country, and a terrorist organization), to analyze the actual European refugee situation. Terrorists may enter Europe as refugees, taking advantage of the Open Door Policy, to attack both countries....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431922