Researchers are increasingly exploring the role of emotions in interactive decision‐making. Recent theories have focused on the interpersonal effects of emotions-the influence of the decisionmaker’s expressed emotions on observers’ decisions and judgments. In this paper, we examine whether...

We experimentally investigate whether individuals are more likely to engage in dishonest behavior after having experienced unfairness perpetrated by an individual with a salient group identity. Two individuals generate an endowment together, but only one can decide how to share it. They either...

We investigate gender differences in lying behavior when the opportunity to tell lies is repeated. In specific, we distinguish the situations in which such an opportunity can be planned versus when it comes as a surprise. We utilize data from an existing published research and show that when the...

This paper examines the idea that adherence to social rules is in part driven by moral emotions and the ability to recognize the emotions of others. Moral emotions like shame and guilt produce negative feelings when social rules are transgressed. The ability to recognize and understand the...

Hypocrisy is the act of claiming moral standards to which one's own behavior does not conform. Instances of hypocrisy, such as the supposedly green furnishing group IKEA's selling of furniture made from illegally felled wood, are frequently reported in the media. In a controlled and incentivized...

Adolescence is an important developmental period for both trust behavior and personality maturation, and individual differences in trust decisions may be related to different personality traits. In the current study, a group of adolescents (n = 483, Mage = 13.5, SDage = 0.4) played two...

In this paper, we consider a novel game theory model for the competitive influence maximization problem. We model this problem as a simultaneous non-cooperative game with complete information and rational players, where there are at least two players who are supposed to be out of the network and...

We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions.