We investigate a private value auction in which a single “entrant” on winning imposes a negative externality on two “regular” bidders. In an English auction when all bidders are active, “regular” bidders free ride, exiting before price reaches their values. In a first-price...

We investigate a private value auction in which a single "entrant" on winning imposes a negative externality on two "regular" bidders. In an English auction, when all bidders are active "regulars" free ride, exiting before price reaches their value. In a first-price sealed-bid auction incentives...

We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. In all treatments we find significant over-expenditure of effort relative to the standard theoretical predictions. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases...

This paper addresses the interaction of voter information and seniority on electoral accountability. We test whether information leads voters to be less tolerant of moral hazard in a legislative system favoring seniority. A simple game theoretic model is used to predict outcomes in a pork-barrel...

We experimentally investigate the impact of recognizing contributors on public good contributions. We vary recognizing all, highest or lowest contributors. Consistent with previous studies, recognizing all contributors significantly increases contributions relative to the baseline. Recognizing...

The focus of this study is on black markets which provide an important segment of the parallel economy. These markets operate in disequilibrium,search and information costs become very important.Trafficking in drugs taken as case, to explore both theoretically and empirically. The problem,...

We experimentally investigate the impact of visibility of contributors and cost of information on public good contributions. First, we vary recognizing all, highest or lowest contributors. Second, we investigate the effect of imposing a cost on viewing contributors. Recognizing all contributors...

The impact on price of current product quality and reputation are estimated using data from the market for Bordeaux wine. A model is proposed in which price is a function of current quality and expected quality, where the latter depends on reputation. Equations determining price and expected...

Auctioneers who have an indivisible object for sale and believe that bidders are risk neutral can find the recipe for an optimal auction in Myerson (1981); auctioneers who believe that bidders are loss averse can find it here: An optimal auction is an all pay auction with minimum bid, and any...