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Competitive dynamic pricing with alternating offers: Theory and experiment

Mak, Vincent; Rapoport, Amnon; Gisches, Eyran J. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 250-264

We propose an equilibrium model of duopolistic dynamic pricing in which a buyer alternates between two sellers for price offers over a finite time horizon. The game ends when the buyer accepts a price offer or the selling season is over, whichever comes first. Previous research (Granot et al.,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049745

On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study

Chernomaz, Kirill - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 690-710

This article explores the effect of a subset of symmetric bidders joining to bid together. Possible applications include mergers, collusion and joint-bidding arrangements. The change produces a “strong” party with a more advantageous value distribution than the remaining “weak”...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049873

Social norms and trust among strangers

Xie, Huan; Lee, Yong-Ju - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 548-555

We study the development of a social norm of trust and reciprocity among a group of strangers via the “contagious strategy” as defined in Kandori (1992). Over an infinite horizon, the players anonymously and randomly meet each other and play a binary trust game. In order to provide the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049814

Beliefs and actions in the trust game: Creating instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect

Costa-Gomes, Miguel A.; Huck, Steffen; Weizsäcker, Georg - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014), pp. 298-309

In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's belief about relevant events, e.g. about other agents' behavior. A growing number of surveys and experiments asks participants to state beliefs explicitly but little is known about the causal relation between beliefs and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013332241

Beliefs and actions in the trust game: Creating instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect

Costa-Gomes, Miguel A.; Huck, Steffen; Weizsäcker, Georg - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 298-309

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117133

An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism

Hugh-Jones, David; Kurino, Morimitsu; Vanberg, Christoph - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 367-380

We report an experiment on the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism for allocating indivisible goods. The PS mechanism, a recently discovered alternative to the widely used Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism, has attractive fairness and efficiency properties if people report their preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931194

Information and learning in oligopoly: An experiment

Bigoni, Maria; Fort, Margherita - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 192-214

choices with data on the information acquisition process they follow. Subjects play a repeated Cournot oligopoly, with limited … a priori information. The econometrics hinges on a model built upon Experience Weighted Attraction learning, and the … simultaneous analysis of data on the information gathered and on actions taken by the subjects. Results suggest that learning is a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049694

Competition fosters trust

Huck, Steffen; Lünser, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 195-209

, efficiency quadruples but is still at only a third of the first best. Adding more information by granting trustors access to all … minimal information, eliminates the trust problem almost completely. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049711

Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study

Chernomaz, Kirill; Levin, Dan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 611-635

We study, theoretically and experimentally, sealed-bid first-price auctions with and without package bidding. In the model, a global bidder bids for multiple items and can benefit from synergies, while local bidders bid for a single item. In the equilibrium, package bidding improves (hurts)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588269

Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions

Kamijo, Y.; Nihonsugi, T.; Takeuchi, A.; Funaki, Y. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) C, pp. 180-195

This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753435

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