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Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control

Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 41-60

Numerous gift-exchange experiments have found a positive wage–effort relationship. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. This paper explores to what extent the separation of ownership and control affects the wage–effort relationship. We compare the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049828

Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers

Non, Arjan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 319-336

altruistic. Absent worker heterogeneity, an altruistic principal signals his altruism by offering relatively weak incentives and … excessively strong incentives and a relatively high expected total compensation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049876

The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: An experiment

Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 573-594

We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After … contract), because this game better sustains (implicit) relational incentives backed by either reputational or reciprocity … conclude that available explicit incentives indeed do affect relational contracting and, anticipating this, agents may choose …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573646

Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

Ambrus, Attila; Lu, Shih En - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 174-189

We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state as the noise in the senders' observations gets small. In the case of replacement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117135

All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 130-134

We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117138

Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 89 (2015) C, pp. 17-33

In the basic adverse selection model, a seller makes a contract offer to a privately informed buyer. A fundamental hypothesis of incentive theory is that the seller may want to offer a menu of contracts to separate the buyer types. In the good state of nature, total surplus is not different from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190612

Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty

Kartik, Navin; Tercieux, Olivier; Holden, Richard - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 284-290

We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738055

Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence

Lehrer, Ehud; Rosenberg, Dinah; Shmaya, Eran - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 179-191

In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738056

Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis

Chen, Ning; Ghosh, Arpita; Lambert, Nicolas S. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 367-391

Prosper, today the second largest social lending marketplace with nearly 1.5 million members and $380 million in funded loans, employed an auction mechanism amongst lenders to finance each borrower's loan until 2010. Given that a basic premise of social lending is cheap loans for borrowers, how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785191

Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties

Weerdt, Mathijs M. de; Harrenstein, Paul; Conitzer, Vincent - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 405-420

A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for the winner that is at least as good for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785192