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The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: An experiment
Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 573-594
We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After … contract), because this game better sustains (implicit) relational incentives backed by either reputational or reciprocity … conclude that available explicit incentives indeed do affect relational contracting and, anticipating this, agents may choose …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573646
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Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control
Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 41-60
Numerous gift-exchange experiments have found a positive wage–effort relationship. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. This paper explores to what extent the separation of ownership and control affects the wage–effort relationship. We compare the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049828
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Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers
Non, Arjan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 319-336
altruistic. Absent worker heterogeneity, an altruistic principal signals his altruism by offering relatively weak incentives and … excessively strong incentives and a relatively high expected total compensation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049876
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Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating?
Boonmanunt, Suparee; Kajackaite, Agne; Meier, Stephan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 124 (2020), pp. 569-578
Cheating such as corruption and tax evasion is prevalent in the developing world; therefore, many interventions have been undertaken to reduce cheating in developing countries. Although some field evidence shows that poverty is correlated with cheating, the causal effect of poverty on cheating in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012392147
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Public Information Quality with Monopolistic Sellers
Sarath, Bharat - 2016
We show that in markets with asymmetric information, even if there is full agreement on the choice of optimal information quality, entrusting the choice of (unverifiable) public information quality to traders who benefit from such information leads to inefficiencies. However, delegation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000722
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A matter of interpretation: Ambiguous contracts and liquidated damages
Grant, Simon; Kline, J. Jude; Quiggin, John - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 180-187
We consider the optimality of liquidated damages contracts in a setting of contractual ambiguity and potential for disputes. We show that when parties are ambiguity averse enough, they will optimally choose liquidated damages contracts and sacrifice risk sharing opportunities.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906692
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Monitored by your friends, not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority
Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Sloof, Randolph; Siemens, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 289-305
's incentives to gather information. Both effects are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906694
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Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
Kirkegaard, René - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 60-69
I consider first-price auctions (FPA) and second-price auctions (SPA) with two asymmetric bidders. The FPA is known to be more profitable than the SPA if the strong bidder's distribution function is convex and the weak bidder's distribution is obtained by truncating or horizontally shifting the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906696
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Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages
Miura, Shintaro - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 419-441
This paper studies a two-dimensional cheap talk game with two senders and one receiver. The senders possess the same information and sequentially send messages about that information. In one-dimensional sequential message cheap talk games where the state space is unbounded, the information is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931178
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Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
Aoyagi, Masaki - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 485-496
A principal acquires information about a shock and then discloses it to an agent. After the disclosure, the principal and agent each decide whether to take costly preparatory actions that yield mutual benefits but only when the shock strikes. The principal maximizes his expected payoff by ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931180