Showing 1 - 10 of 240
We experimentally assess the predictive power of two equilibrium selection principles for binary N-player entry games with strategic complementarities. In static entry games, we test the theory of global games which posits that players play games of complete information as if they were playing a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664595
We study first- and second-order subjective expectations (beliefs) in strategic decision-making. We elicit probabilistically both first- and second-order beliefs and apply the method to a Hide-and-Seek experiment. We study the relationship between choice and beliefs in terms of whether observed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738051
This paper investigates the possibility that people discover effective heuristics when playing similar perfect information games of varying complexity. We call this discovery experience Eureka Learning. We use a change-point analysis to identify 35 percent of our subjects as Eureka Learners.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662454
In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjectsʼ beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049709
We report findings from experiments on two delegation–communication games. An uninformed principal chooses whether to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049784
In three experiments we examine the extent to which strategic sophistication (i.e., inductive reasoning, iterative … similar results arise in a game requiring induction. In the second two experiments we extend the literature in new directions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049801
The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a correct common prior in a two-person signaling game. Equilibrium selection arguments predict that different equilibria may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049808
We study how the predictive power of level-k models changes as we perturb the classical beauty contest setting along two dimensions: the strength of the coordination motive and the information symmetry. We use a variation of the Morris and Shin (2002) model as the unified framework for our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785207
Rule learning posits that decision makers, rather than choosing over actions, choose over behavioral rules with different levels of sophistication. Rules are reinforced over time based on their historically observed payoffs in a given game. Past works on rule learning have shown that when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597534
This paper aspires to fill a conspicuous gap in the literature regarding learning in games—the absence of empirical verification of learning rules involving pattern recognition. Weighted fictitious play is extended to detect two-period patterns in opponentsʼ behavior and to comply with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049668