bargaining game in which negotiators can make strategic commitments to durable offers. Commitments decay stochastically, but …

We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation. We modify the standard Nash demand game … so that incompatible demands do not necessarily lead to the disagreement outcome. Rather, with exogenous probability q …, one bargainer receives his/her demand, with the other getting the remainder. We use an asymmetric bargaining set …

We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient … players bargain about the division of a shrinking surplus under a standard bargaining protocol in discrete time with constant … recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player can commit to some part of the surplus. This commitment remains binding …

Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually. During this process parties reach intermediate agreements. These … intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. We identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by … three prominent bargaining solutions, the Nash, Proportional (and as a special case to the Egalitarian solution) and …

We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer–Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict … altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making …

I study a bilateral bargaining game in which the size of the surplus follows a stochastic process and in which players … might be optimistic about their bargaining power. Following Yildiz (2003), I model optimism by assuming that players have …