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Shunning uncertainty: The neglect of learning opportunities

Trautmann, Stefan T.; Zeckhauser, Richard J. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 44-55

significant expected payoffs when they shun uncertain alternatives in favor of known ones. Worse, when information is revealed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049682

The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study

Brindisi, Francesco; Çelen, Boğaçhan; Hyndman, Kyle - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 264-281

This paper investigates the role of endogenous timing of decisions on coordination under asymmetric information. In the … coordination: a learning effect (early decisions reveal information) and a complementarity effect (early decisions eliminate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049850

First-best collusion without communication

Rachmilevitch, Shiran - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 224-230

I study a 2-bidder infinitely repeated IPV first-price auction without transfers, communication, or public randomization, where each bidderʼs valuation can assume, in each of the (statistically independent) stage games, one of three possible values. Under certain distributional assumptions, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049799

Licensing process innovations when losersʼ messages determine royalty rates

Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 388-402

We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that awards a limited number of unrestricted licenses to those firms that report the highest cost reductions, combined with royalty licenses to others. Firmsʼ messages are dual signals of their cost reductions: the message of those who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049835

Attributes

Klabjan, Diego; Olszewski, Wojciech; Wolinsky, Asher - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 190-206

partial information. We characterize the solution in some special cases and discuss the computability of the solution in more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117130

Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

Ambrus, Attila; Lu, Shih En - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 174-189

state spaces. The results imply that when there are multiple experts from whom to solicit information, if the state space is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117135

How do judgmental overconfidence and overoptimism shape innovative activity?

Herz, Holger; Schunk, Daniel; Zehnder, Christian - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 1-23

Recent field evidence suggests a positive link between overconfidence and innovative activities. In this paper we argue that the connection between overconfidence and innovation is more complex than the previous literature suggests. In particular, we show theoretically and experimentally that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738050

First- and second-order subjective expectations in strategic decision-making: Experimental evidence

Manski, Charles F.; Neri, Claudia - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 232-254

We study first- and second-order subjective expectations (beliefs) in strategic decision-making. We elicit probabilistically both first- and second-order beliefs and apply the method to a Hide-and-Seek experiment. We study the relationship between choice and beliefs in terms of whether observed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738051

Markets for information: Of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies

Cabrales, Antonio; Gottardi, Piero - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 24-44

In this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential … competitors. Agents may sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of … what they learnt. Reports are unverifiable – cheap talk messages – hence the quality of the information transmitted depends …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738052

Level-k reasoning in a generalized beauty contest

Shapiro, Dmitry; Shi, Xianwen; Zillante, Artie - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 308-329

two dimensions: the strength of the coordination motive and the information symmetry. We use a variation of the Morris and … information and a strong coordination motive. Their predictive power weakens significantly when either private information is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785207

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