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Shunning uncertainty: The neglect of learning opportunities

Trautmann, Stefan T.; Zeckhauser, Richard J. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 44-55

significant expected payoffs when they shun uncertain alternatives in favor of known ones. Worse, when information is revealed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049682

The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study

Brindisi, Francesco; Çelen, Boğaçhan; Hyndman, Kyle - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 264-281

This paper investigates the role of endogenous timing of decisions on coordination under asymmetric information. In the … coordination: a learning effect (early decisions reveal information) and a complementarity effect (early decisions eliminate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049850

First-best collusion without communication

Rachmilevitch, Shiran - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 224-230

I study a 2-bidder infinitely repeated IPV first-price auction without transfers, communication, or public randomization, where each bidderʼs valuation can assume, in each of the (statistically independent) stage games, one of three possible values. Under certain distributional assumptions, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049799

Licensing process innovations when losersʼ messages determine royalty rates

Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 388-402

We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that awards a limited number of unrestricted licenses to those firms that report the highest cost reductions, combined with royalty licenses to others. Firmsʼ messages are dual signals of their cost reductions: the message of those who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049835

Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of Prat & Rustichini's model

Ensthaler, Ludwig; Huck, Steffen; Leutgeb, Johannes - In: Games and Economic Behavior 119 (2020), pp. 30-55

From the regulation of sports to lawmaking in parliament, in many situations one group of people (“agents”) make decisions that affect the payoffs of others (“principals”) who may offer action-contingent transfers in order to sway the agents' decisions. Prat and Rustichini (2003)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012221614

Bribing the Self

Gneezy, Uri; Saccardo, Silvia; Serra-Garcia, Marta; van … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 120 (2020), pp. 311-324

Expert advice is often biased in ways that benefit the advisor. We demonstrate how self-deception helps advisors be biased while preserving their self-image as ethical and identify limits to advisors' ability to self-deceive. In experiments where advisors recommend one of two investments to a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012505192

Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games

Haruvy, Ernan; Stahl, Dale O. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 208-221

Rule learning posits that decision makers, rather than choosing over actions, choose over behavioral rules with different levels of sophistication. Rules are reinforced over time based on their historically observed payoffs in a given game. Past works on rule learning have shown that when...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597534

The communication burden of payment determination

Babaioff, Moshe; Blumrosen, Liad; Schapira, Michael - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 153-167

certain amount of information x needs to be communicated just for computing the outcome of a certain social-choice function …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603336

Endogenous information and stochastic contracts

Terstiege, Stefan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 535-547

information before they decide whether to join the contract. It is conjectured that the results also apply to the more natural … scenario where information can be acquired either before or after signing. This paper shows that, in fact, the latter scenario … is more favorable for the principal. Using stochastic contracts, she can induce information acquisition with some …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588265

Communication and efficiency in auctions

Kos, Nenad - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 233-249

We study auctions under restricted communication. Agents have valuations distributed over an interval but can only report one of a finite number of messages. We provide necessary conditions for welfare as well as revenue maximizing auctions in the independent private values case when bidders...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573658

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