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Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences
Houba, Harold; Wen, Quan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 507-516
characterized by a minmax problem involving efficient equilibrium payoffs that are above the bargaining frontier, which is possible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049845
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Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining
Ortner, Juan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 352-366
I study a bilateral bargaining game in which the size of the surplus follows a stochastic process and in which players … might be optimistic about their bargaining power. Following Yildiz (2003), I model optimism by assuming that players have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603332
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Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
Wolitzky, Alexander - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 595-607
We study whether allowing players to sign binding contracts governing future play leads to reputation effects in repeated games with long-run players. We proceed by extending the analysis of Abreu and Pearce (2007) by allowing for the possibility that different behavioral types may not be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573642
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Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
Ellingsen, Tore; Miettinen, Topi - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 353-366
bargaining game in which negotiators can make strategic commitments to durable offers. Commitments decay stochastically, but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931181
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Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
Sawa, Ryoji - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 90-111
This paper examines a dynamic process of unilateral and joint deviations of agents and the resulting stochastic evolution of social conventions. Our model unifies stochastic stability analysis in static settings, including normal form games, network formation games, and simple exchange...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117144
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Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching
Rivas, Javier - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 148-162
We study a setting in which imitative players are matched into pairs to play a Prisonerʼs Dilemma game. A well-known result in such setting is that under random matching cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition. The novelty of this paper is that we consider partial rematching:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049880
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Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study
Anbarci, Nejat; Feltovich, Nick - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 495-514
We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation. We modify the standard Nash demand game …, one bargainer receives his/her demand, with the other getting the remainder. We use an asymmetric bargaining set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588271
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Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining
Britz, Volker - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 345-351
We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient … players bargain about the division of a shrinking surplus under a standard bargaining protocol in discrete time with constant … recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player can commit to some part of the surplus. This commitment remains binding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603330
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Promises and conventions – An approach to pre-play agreements
Miettinen, Topi - In: Games and Economic Behavior 80 (2013) C, pp. 68-84
I analyze how informal agreements can be sustained by moral emotions with regard to a large class of two-player games. Specifically, I assume that people feel guilty if they breach an agreement and that the guilt increases according to the degree of the harm inflicted on the other. A central...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010666018
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Investment incentives in bilateral trading
Lau, Stephanie - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 538-552
We characterize the surplus-maximizing trading mechanism under two-sided incomplete information and interim individual rationality, when one party can make a value-enhancing specific investment. This mechanism exhibits a trade-off between providing investment incentives and inducing voluntary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573643