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Learning to play Bayesian games

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 2, pp. 282-303

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408772

Introduction to the Special Issue

Vohra, Rakesh; Levine, David K.; Foster, Dean - In: Games and Economic Behavior 29 (1999) 1-2, pp. 1-6

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408819

The evolution of cooperation through imitation

Levine, David K.; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - In: Games and Economic Behavior 58 (2007) 2, pp. 293-315

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408995

Conditional Universal Consistency

Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 29 (1999) 1-2, pp. 104-130

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005409128

An Easier Way to Calibrate

Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 29 (1999) 1-2, pp. 131-137

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005409226

Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient

Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Games and Economic Behavior 61 (2007) 1, pp. 27-49

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005409424

When is reputation bad?

Ely, Jeffrey; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 63 (2008) 2, pp. 498-526

In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www.najecon.org/v4.htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785-814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413566