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Competition fosters trust
Huck, Steffen; Lünser, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 195-209
We study the effects of reputation and competition in a trust game. If trustees are anonymous, outcomes are poor …: trustees are not trustworthy, and trustors do not trust. If trustees are identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049711
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On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict
Lacomba, Juan A.; Lagos, Francisco; Reuben, Ernesto; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 40-57
We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer–Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict … altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785206
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Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle
Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 61-76
The generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the alliance may break up, and its members may fight against each other over the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603335
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All-pay war
Hodler, Roland; Yektaş, Hadi - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 2, pp. 526-540
We study a model of conflicts and wars in which the outcome is uncertain not because of luck on the battlefield as in standard models, but because countries lack information about their opponent. In this model expected resource levels and production and military technologies are common...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049701
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Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study
Anbarci, Nejat; Feltovich, Nick - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 495-514
We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation. We modify the standard Nash demand game so that incompatible demands do not necessarily lead to the disagreement outcome. Rather, with exogenous probability q, one bargainer receives his/her demand, with the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588271
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Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining
Britz, Volker - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 345-351
We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient players bargain about the division of a shrinking surplus under a standard bargaining protocol in discrete time with constant recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603330
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The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game
Cheikbossian, Guillaume - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 68-82
This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking activities in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking game between two groups of different size. We first investigate Nash reversion strategies to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049667
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The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
Masuda, Takehito; Okano, Yoshitaka; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 73-85
We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the otherʼs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049764
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Justifiable punishments in repeated games
Aramendia, Miguel; Wen, Quan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 16-28
In repeated games, subgame perfection requires all continuation strategy profiles must be effective to enforce the equilibrium; they serve as punishments should deviations occur. It does not require whether a punishment can be justified for the deviation, which creates a great deal of freedom in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117126
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Identities, selection, and contributions in a public-goods game
Charness, Gary; Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Jiménez, Natalia - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 322-338
The notions of one's social identity and group membership have recently become topics for economic theory and … experiments, and recent research has shown the importance of identity in a wide array of economic environments. But predictions … are unclear when there is some trade-off between one's identity (e.g., race, gender, handedness) and potential monetary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049776