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Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining

Britz, Volker - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 345-351

We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient … recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player can commit to some part of the surplus. This commitment remains binding … something which has become impossible. The model offers insight on the relative importance of proposal power and commitment for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603330

On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols

Britz, Volker; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 178-183

We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining protocol, that is, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785188

Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments

Ellingsen, Tore; Miettinen, Topi - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 353-366

attrition: Negotiators initially commit to incompatible offers, but agreement occurs once a negotiator's commitment decays. If …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931181

Bargaining with revoking costs

Dutta, Rohan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 144-153

A simple two stage bilateral bargaining game is analyzed. The players simultaneously demand shares of a unit size pie. If the demands add up to more than one, the players simultaneously choose whether to stick to their demand or accept the otherʼs offer. While both parties sticking to their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049846

Monitored by your friends, not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority

Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Sloof, Randolph; Siemens, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 289-305

In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906694

An Experiment on a Core Controversy

Yan, Huibin; Friedman, Daniel; Munro, David - 2021

A longstanding criticism of the core is that it is too sensitive to small changes in player numbers, as in a well known example where one extra seller (resp. buyer) causes the entire surplus to go to the buyer's (seller's) side. We test this example in the lab, using several different trading...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013238103

Robustness of intermediate agreements for the discrete Raiffa solution

Trockel, Walter - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 32-36

First via a counter example it is shown that Proposition 3 of Anbarci and Sun (2013) is false. Then a gap and a mistake in their proof are identified. Finally, a modified version of their Proposition 3 is stated and proved.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906699

Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets

Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 624-630

In this study we present a simple mechanism in a many-to-one matching market where multiple costless applications are allowed. The mechanism is based on the principles of eligibility and priority and it implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. We extend the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931188

On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm

Bando, Keisuke - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 269-287

This study analyzes a preference revelation game in the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm in a college admission problem. We assume that each college's true preferences are known publicly, and analyze the strategic behavior of students. We demonstrate the existence of a strictly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931189

An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism

Hugh-Jones, David; Kurino, Morimitsu; Vanberg, Christoph - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 367-380

We report an experiment on the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism for allocating indivisible goods. The PS mechanism, a recently discovered alternative to the widely used Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism, has attractive fairness and efficiency properties if people report their preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931194