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Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining

Britz, Volker - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 345-351

We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient … recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player can commit to some part of the surplus. This commitment remains binding … something which has become impossible. The model offers insight on the relative importance of proposal power and commitment for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603330

On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols

Britz, Volker; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 178-183

We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining protocol, that is, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785188

Bargaining with revoking costs

Dutta, Rohan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 144-153

A simple two stage bilateral bargaining game is analyzed. The players simultaneously demand shares of a unit size pie. If the demands add up to more than one, the players simultaneously choose whether to stick to their demand or accept the otherʼs offer. While both parties sticking to their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049846

Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments

Ellingsen, Tore; Miettinen, Topi - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 353-366

attrition: Negotiators initially commit to incompatible offers, but agreement occurs once a negotiator's commitment decays. If …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931181

Monitored by your friends, not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority

Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Sloof, Randolph; Siemens, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 289-305

In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906694

Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem

Holzman, Ron; Samet, Dov - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 277-285

When men and women are objectively ranked in a marriage problem, say by beauty, then pairing individuals of equal rank is the only stable matching. We generalize this observation by providing bounds on the size of the rank gap between mates in a stable matching in terms of the size of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117123

Priority matchings revisited

Okumura, Yasunori - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 242-249

We consider a pairwise kidney exchange model. Roth et al. (2005) define priority matchings of the model and introduce a mechanism to derive them. In this paper, we re-examine the priority matching. First, we consider a general priority ordering where multiple patients may hold equal priority. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117129

Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets

Azevedo, Eduardo M. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 207-223

This paper considers a simple equilibrium model of an imperfectly competitive two-sided matching market. Firms and workers may have heterogeneous preferences over matches on the other side, and the model allows for both uniform and personalized wages or contracts. To make the model tractable, I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738054

Bayes–Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction

Gomes, Renato; Sweeney, Kane - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 421-437

We develop a Bayes–Nash analysis of the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, the multi-unit auction used by search engines to sell sponsored advertising positions. Our main result characterizes the efficient Bayes–Nash equilibrium of the GSP and provides a necessary and sufficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785200

Robustness of intermediate agreements for the discrete Raiffa solution

Trockel, Walter - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 32-36

First via a counter example it is shown that Proposition 3 of Anbarci and Sun (2013) is false. Then a gap and a mistake in their proof are identified. Finally, a modified version of their Proposition 3 is stated and proved.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906699