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Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts

Wolitzky, Alexander - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 595-607

We study whether allowing players to sign binding contracts governing future play leads to reputation effects in …, whether reputation effects emerge in repeated games with contracts depends on details of the prior distribution over …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573642

Pareto optimality in coalition formation

Aziz, Haris; Brandt, Felix; Harrenstein, Paul - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 562-581

A minimal requirement on allocative efficiency in the social sciences is Pareto optimality. In this paper, we identify a close structural connection between Pareto optimality and perfection that has various algorithmic consequences for coalition formation. Based on this insight, we formulate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719482

Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 145-164

sorting and incentives. Short- and long-term contracts often coexist: The best firms always use short-term contracts to hire … high-ability senior workers, firms with less profitable projects use short-term contracts to save on the cost of hiring …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049866

Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games

Bloch, Francis; van den Nouweland, Anne - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 339-353

This paper proposes axiomatic foundations of expectation formation rules, by which deviating players anticipate the reaction of external players in a partition function game. The projection rule is the only rule satisfying subset consistency and responsiveness to the original partition of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117136

Fair by design: Multidimensional envy-free mechanisms

Mu'alem, Ahuva - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 29-46

We address the common scenario where a group of agents wants to divide a set of items fairly, and at the same time seeks to optimize a global goal. Suppose that each item is a task and we want to find an allocation that minimizes the completion time of the last task in an envy-free manner, where...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117143

Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties

Weerdt, Mathijs M. de; Harrenstein, Paul; Conitzer, Vincent - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 405-420

A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms …, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for … the winner that is at least as good for the center as any of the contracts offered by the non-winning players. When each …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785192

Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies

Tsakas, Elias - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 126-144

In this paper, we introduce a notion of epistemic equivalence between hierarchies of conditional beliefs and hierarchies of lexicographic beliefs, thus extending the standard equivalence results of Halpern (2010) and Brandenburger et al. (2007) to an interactive setting, and we show that there...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785196

Imperfect memory and choice under risk

Gottlieb, Daniel - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 127-158

provides a prior-dependent theory of regret aversion and allows for prior-dependent information attitudes. It implies that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906700

Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game

Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 921-935

This paper aspires to fill a conspicuous gap in the literature regarding learning in games—the absence of empirical verification of learning rules involving pattern recognition. Weighted fictitious play is extended to detect two-period patterns in opponentsʼ behavior and to comply with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049668

On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations

Krasteva, Silvana; Yildirim, Huseyin - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 714-730

information about negotiations are also investigated. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049671

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