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Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 50-68
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for asymmetric awareness of actions. We extend Pearceʼs (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties, and prove existence.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049860
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A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
Chen, Yi-Chun - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 587-597
We prove that the structure theorem for rationalizability originally from Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) applies to any finite extensive-form game with perfect recall and suitably rich payoffs. We demonstrate that the ties induced by the extensive form do not change the result of Weinstein and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049820
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Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 100-121
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are … desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049829
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Social norms and trust among strangers
Xie, Huan; Lee, Yong-Ju - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 548-555
We study the development of a social norm of trust and reciprocity among a group of strangers via the “contagious strategy” as defined in Kandori (1992). Over an infinite horizon, the players anonymously and randomly meet each other and play a binary trust game. In order to provide the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049814
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Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
Laclau, M. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 136-160
: communication can be public, private or a mixture of both. Payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. First, for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931179
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Stability and trembles in extensive-form games
Heller, Yuval - In: Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) C, pp. 132-136
A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten (1983) notion of limit ESS. This note demonstrates that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049840
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Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: Guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options
Beck, Adrian; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Qiu, Jianying; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 145-164
In a credence goods game with an expert and a consumer, we study experimentally the impact of two devices that are predicted to induce consumer-friendly behavior if the expert has a propensity to feel guilty when he believes that he violates the consumerʼs payoff expectations: (i) an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049695
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Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium
Shimoji, Makoto - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 441-447
We introduce a condition, Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibrium. If beliefs are assumed to be independent and unitary, Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium are outcome-equivalent. We show that the set of Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibria and the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573648
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Universal type structures with unawareness
Heinsalu, Sander - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 255-266
Infinite hierarchies of awareness and beliefs arise in games with unawareness, similarly to belief hierarchies in … structure with unawareness where each type has an awareness level and a belief over types. Countable hierarchies are therefore … sufficient to describe all uncertainty in games with unawareness. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049778
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Conditional belief types
Di Tillio, Alfredo; Halpern, Joseph Y.; Samet, Dov - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 253-268
We study type spaces where a player's type at a state is a conditional probability on the space. We axiomatize these spaces using conditional belief operators, examining three additional axioms of increasing strength. First, introspection, which requires the agent to be unconditionally certain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931186