Showing 1 - 10 of 220
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for asymmetric awareness of actions. We extend Pearceʼs (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties, and prove existence.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049860
We prove that the structure theorem for rationalizability originally from Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) applies to any finite extensive-form game with perfect recall and suitably rich payoffs. We demonstrate that the ties induced by the extensive form do not change the result of Weinstein and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049820
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are … desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049829
We study the development of a social norm of trust and reciprocity among a group of strangers via the “contagious strategy” as defined in Kandori (1992). Over an infinite horizon, the players anonymously and randomly meet each other and play a binary trust game. In order to provide the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049814
: communication can be public, private or a mixture of both. Payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. First, for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931179
A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten (1983) notion of limit ESS. This note demonstrates that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049840
In a credence goods game with an expert and a consumer, we study experimentally the impact of two devices that are predicted to induce consumer-friendly behavior if the expert has a propensity to feel guilty when he believes that he violates the consumerʼs payoff expectations: (i) an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049695
We introduce a condition, Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibrium. If beliefs are assumed to be independent and unitary, Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium are outcome-equivalent. We show that the set of Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibria and the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573648
Infinite hierarchies of awareness and beliefs arise in games with unawareness, similarly to belief hierarchies in … structure with unawareness where each type has an awareness level and a belief over types. Countable hierarchies are therefore … sufficient to describe all uncertainty in games with unawareness. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049778
We model a common pool resource game under environmental uncertainty, where individuals in a symmetric group face the dilemma of sharing a common resource. Each player chooses a consumption level and obtains a corresponding share of that resource, but if total consumption exceeds a sustainable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049848