Showing 1 - 10 of 173
characterized by a minmax problem involving efficient equilibrium payoffs that are above the bargaining frontier, which is possible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049845
might be optimistic about their bargaining power. Following Yildiz (2003), I model optimism by assuming that players have …I study a bilateral bargaining game in which the size of the surplus follows a stochastic process and in which players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603332
We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation. We modify the standard Nash demand game …, one bargainer receives his/her demand, with the other getting the remainder. We use an asymmetric bargaining set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588271
We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient … players bargain about the division of a shrinking surplus under a standard bargaining protocol in discrete time with constant … recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player can commit to some part of the surplus. This commitment remains binding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603330
Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually. During this process parties reach intermediate agreements. These … three prominent bargaining solutions, the Nash, Proportional (and as a special case to the Egalitarian solution) and … these solutionsʼ bargaining theories. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049666
Cake cutting is a common metaphor for the division of a heterogeneous divisible good. There are numerous papers that study the problem of fairly dividing a cake; a small number of them also take into account self-interested agents and consequent strategic issues, but these papers focus on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603337
We characterize the surplus-maximizing trading mechanism under two-sided incomplete information and interim individual rationality, when one party can make a value-enhancing specific investment. This mechanism exhibits a trade-off between providing investment incentives and inducing voluntary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573643
We propose an equilibrium model of duopolistic dynamic pricing in which a buyer alternates between two sellers for price offers over a finite time horizon. The game ends when the buyer accepts a price offer or the selling season is over, whichever comes first. Previous research (Granot et al.,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049745
We study a sealed-bid auction between two bidders with asymmetric independent private values. The two bidders own asymmetric shares in a partnership. The higher bidder buys the lower bidderʼs shares at a per-unit price that is a convex combination of the two bids. The weight of the lower bid is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049794
We present a model of two-sided matching where utility is non-transferable and information about individualsʼ skills is private, utilities are strictly increasing in the partnerʼs skill and satisfy increasing differences. Skills can be either revealed or kept hidden, but while agents on one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049892