We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive...

We propose a new procurement procedure that allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are the following: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are...

In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement. If financial soundness is not perfectly observable, then financially weaker contractors are selected with higher probability in any incentive compatible mechanism. Informational rents are...

This paper shows that in private value environments, strategy-proofness and the rectangular property are necessary conditions for (full) robust implementation (Bergemann and Morris, 2011). As corollaries, we obtain the equivalence between robust and secure implementation (Saijo et al., 2007),...

We consider a model of cost-based procurement in which the principal faces Knightian uncertainty about the agent's preferences for cost reduction. We show that a particularly simple incentive scheme—a menu comprising a fixed-price contract and a cost-reimbursement contract—minimizes the...

From the regulation of sports to lawmaking in parliament, in many situations one group of people (“agents”) make decisions that affect the payoffs of others (“principals”) who may offer action-contingent transfers in order to sway the agents' decisions. Prat and Rustichini (2003)...

The lack of price guidance towards efficiency relevant packages in ascending combinatorial clock auctions (ACCA) can lead to a low-efficiency allocation of goods. We propose a descending price combinatorial clock auction (DCCA) with a newly devised pricing strategy to improve on this problem....

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive...

We explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided combinatorial auctions for a previously untested class of value profiles in which synergies arise from shared fixed costs. We find that, in many cases, a simulator that bids straightforwardly does well in predicting auction performance, but...

I consider first-price auctions (FPA) and second-price auctions (SPA) with two asymmetric bidders. The FPA is known to be more profitable than the SPA if the strong bidder's distribution function is convex and the weak bidder's distribution is obtained by truncating or horizontally shifting the...