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Newton, Jonathan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 842-854

benefit – and incorporates it into the framework of evolutionary game theory that underpins the social learning literature. An …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577245

Beyond fictitious play beliefs: Incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching

Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 69-85

Belief models capable of detecting 2- to 5-period patterns in repeated games by matching the current historical context to similar realizations of past play are presented. The models are implemented in a cognitive framework, ACT-R, and vary in how they implement similarity-based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049875

The strategic value of recall

Peretz, Ron - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 332-351

This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597538

On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games

Hörner, Johannes; Takahashi, Satoru; Vieille, Nicolas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 70-83

This paper provides a dual characterization of the existing ones for the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in a class of finite stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg et al. (1994),...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049759

Strategic information exchange

Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 444-467

We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In our model, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049786

Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality

Bavly, Gilad; Neyman, Abraham - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 71-89

Correlation of players' actions may evolve in the common course of the play of a repeated game with perfect monitoring (“online correlation”). In this paper we study the concealment of such correlation from a boundedly rational player. We show that “strong” players, i.e., players whose...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117125

A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network

Laclau, Marie - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 711-737

I consider repeated games on a network where players interact and communicate with their neighbors. At each stage, players choose actions and exchange private messages with their neighbors. The payoff of a player depends only on his own action and on the actions of his neighbors. At the end of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588262

Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring

Laclau, M. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 136-160

I consider repeated games with private monitoring played on a network. Each player has a set of neighbors with whom he interacts: a player's payoff depends on his own and his neighbors' actions only. Monitoring is private and imperfect: each player observes his stage payoff but not the actions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931179

Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma

Maruta, Toshimasa; Okada, Akira - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 269-284

We consider dynamic group formation in repeated n-person prisonerʼs dilemma. Agreements in coalitional bargaining are self-binding in that they are supported as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games. Individuals are allowed to renegotiate the cooperating group agreement through a process...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049791

Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game

Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 921-935

This paper aspires to fill a conspicuous gap in the literature regarding learning in games—the absence of empirical … verification of learning rules involving pattern recognition. Weighted fictitious play is extended to detect two-period patterns in … adequately represent the complete learning process of game players. Additionally, standard weighted fictitious play models are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049668

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