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Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
Troyan, Peter - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 936-947
Recent work has highlighted welfare gains from the use of the Boston mechanism over deferred acceptance (DA) in school choice problems, in particular finding that when cardinal utility is taken into account, Boston interim Pareto dominates DA in certain incomplete information environments with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577249
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School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action
Kojima, Fuhito - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 685-693
affirmative action policies inevitably hurt every minority student – the purported beneficiaries – under any stable matching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577242
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Harmful signaling in matching markets
Kushnir, Alexey - In: Games and Economic Behavior 80 (2013) C, pp. 209-218
-sided matching game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Each worker has either the same “typical” known preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049896
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Matching mechanisms and matching quality: Evidence from a top university in China
Wu, Binzhen; Zhong, Xiaohan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) C, pp. 196-215
We compare competing college admission matching mechanisms that differ in preference submission timing (pre-exam, post …-exam but pre-score, or post-score) and in matching procedure (Boston (BOS) and serial dictatorship (SD) matching). Pre … or SD matching are ex-post fair and efficient, they are not so ex-ante. Instead, the mechanism with pre-exam submission …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753436
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Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
Kojima, Fuhito - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 1-14
We study resource allocation with multi-unit demand, such as the allocation of courses to students. In contrast to the case of single-unit demand, no stable mechanism, not even the (student-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm, achieves desirable properties: it is not strategy-proof and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719484
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Optimal truncation in matching markets
Coles, Peter; Shorrer, Ran - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 591-615
Although no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants (Roth, 1982 … on the limits of strategic manipulation, our results serve as a reminder that without pre-conditions ensuring truthful … reporting, there exists a potential for significant manipulation even in settings where agents have little information. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931197
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Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis
Braun, Sebastian; Dwenger, Nadja; Kübler, Dorothea; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 232-251
This paper studies the implementation of quotas in matching markets. In a controlled laboratory environment, we compare …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049830
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Truth, justice, and cake cutting
Chen, Yiling; Lai, John K.; Parkes, David C.; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 284-297
Cake cutting is a common metaphor for the division of a heterogeneous divisible good. There are numerous papers that study the problem of fairly dividing a cake; a small number of them also take into account self-interested agents and consequent strategic issues, but these papers focus on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603337
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Dress to impress: Brands as status symbols
Mazali, Rogério; Rodrigues-Neto, José A. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 103-131
We analyzed the market for indivisible, pure status goods. Firms produce and sell different brands of pure status goods to a population that is willing to signal individual abilities to potential matches in another population. Individual status is determined by the most expensive status good one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719494
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Testing substitutability
Hatfield, John William; Immorlica, Nicole; Kominers, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 639-645
We provide an algorithm for testing the substitutability of a length-N preference relation over a set of contracts X in time O(|X|3⋅N3). Access to the preference relation is essential for this result: We show that a substitutability-testing algorithm with access only to an agentʼs choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049779