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Why votes have value: Instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors

Dittmann, Ingolf; Kübler, Dorothea; Maug, Ernst; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) C, pp. 17-38

interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have … the vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. The observed voting premium in the main treatment is high and can … model of instrumental voting, which assumes that individuals are overconfident and that they overestimate the errors of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049763

Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games

Cason, Timothy N.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 26-43

Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending costly efforts. Allowing intra-group communication leads...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664597

Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 122-137

We investigate the emergence and enforcement of contribution norms to public goods in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. With survey data we demonstrate that uninvolved individuals hold well defined yet conflicting normative views of fair contribution rules related to efficiency, equality,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603338

The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally

Masuda, Takehito; Okano, Yoshitaka; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 73-85

We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the otherʼs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049764

Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: Experimental evidence

Van Essen, Matthew; Lazzati, Natalia; Walker, Mark - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 366-381

We describe an experimental comparison of the out-of-equilibrium performance of three allocation mechanisms designed to achieve Lindahl outcomes as Nash equilibria: the mechanisms due to Walker (1981), Kim (1993), and Chen (2002). We find that Chenʼs mechanism, which is supermodular, converges...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049821

“Bucket auctions” for charity

Carpenter, Jeffrey; Holmes, Jessica; Matthews, Peter Hans - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 260-276

Donations in-kind can be a mixed blessing for charities, who are often more adept at solicitation than resale. Many organizations rely on raffles to turn donations into cash, but auctions are also common. Theory predicts that all-pay mechanisms should produce more revenue than winner-pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117127

First- and second-order subjective expectations in strategic decision-making: Experimental evidence

Manski, Charles F.; Neri, Claudia - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 232-254

We study first- and second-order subjective expectations (beliefs) in strategic decision-making. We elicit probabilistically both first- and second-order beliefs and apply the method to a Hide-and-Seek experiment. We study the relationship between choice and beliefs in terms of whether observed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738051

Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games

Duffy, John; Ochs, Jack - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 97-116

relevant state variable exceeds a certain threshold. The subgame perfect entry threshold of the dynamic game will generally … differ from the global game threshold of the static version of the same game. Nevertheless, our experimental findings suggest …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664595

Compulsory versus voluntary voting: An experimental study

Bhattacharya, Sourav; Duffy, John; Kim, Sun-Tak - In: Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) C, pp. 111-131

We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in a voting game with common … preferences. Rational choice theory predicts sharp differences in voter behavior between these two institutions. If voting is … compulsory, then voters may find it rational to vote insincerely, i.e., against their private information. If voting is voluntary …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753437

On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict

Lacomba, Juan A.; Lagos, Francisco; Reuben, Ernesto; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 40-57

We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer–Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785206

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