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This paper reconsiders the valuation equilibrium concept (Jehiel and Samet, 2007) and proposes an additional regularity condition concerning the playersʼ equilibrium strategies. The condition, which requires equilibrium strategies to induce the same local behaviour at all nodes with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049752
Renegotiation and conflict resolution are studied in relational contracting under subjective evaluation. Renegotiation … performance levels is compressed and the contract is less extreme compared to the case without renegotiation. This effect is … stronger when the players are less patient. Second, renegotiation typically renders termination impossible; the contract relies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049679
We consider dynamic group formation in repeated n-person prisonerʼs dilemma. Agreements in coalitional bargaining are self-binding in that they are supported as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games. Individuals are allowed to renegotiate the cooperating group agreement through a process...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049791