In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed-bid auctions with symmetric independent private values and 400 participants, we collected information on the female participantsʼ menstrual cycles and the use of hormonal contraceptives. We find that naturally cycling women bid significantly...

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule “imitate-if-better” can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a...

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out...

We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for asymmetric awareness of actions. We extend Pearceʼs (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties, and prove existence.