Showing 1 - 10 of 234
, stochastically stable states may be inefficient, even when they induce a positive (suboptimal) level of investment. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597533
significant in a two-sided, one-buyer-many-seller model with complementarity. Our central result is that the severity of holdout … outside option of the buyer, and (c) the marginal contribution of the last seller. We find that although the accepted wisdom … that holdout is severe, goes through whenever either the buyer has no outside option, or the bargaining protocol is secret …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573655
We offer a tractable model of tough negotiations and delayed agreement. The setting is an infinite horizon bilateral bargaining game in which negotiators can make strategic commitments to durable offers. Commitments decay stochastically, but uncommitted negotiators can make new commitments. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931181
We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation. We modify the standard Nash demand game so that incompatible demands do not necessarily lead to the disagreement outcome. Rather, with exogenous probability q, one bargainer receives his/her demand, with the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588271
We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient players bargain about the division of a shrinking surplus under a standard bargaining protocol in discrete time with constant recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603330
I analyze how informal agreements can be sustained by moral emotions with regard to a large class of two-player games. Specifically, I assume that people feel guilty if they breach an agreement and that the guilt increases according to the degree of the harm inflicted on the other. A central...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010666018
rationality, when one party can make a value-enhancing specific investment. This mechanism exhibits a trade-off between providing … investment incentives and inducing voluntary participation. We analyze how the trading area of the optimal mechanism is further … distorted in order to provide investment incentives. Applications of our main results and the underlying geometric analysis to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573643
We propose an equilibrium model of duopolistic dynamic pricing in which a buyer alternates between two sellers for … price offers over a finite time horizon. The game ends when the buyer accepts a price offer or the selling season is over … buyer is commonly known to be myopic; our analysis suggests that when she is known to be strategic price offers over the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049745
between a buyer and a seller and the first-price auction between two buyers (or two sellers). Combining results from those two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049794
This paper considers a resource allocation mechanism that utilizes a profit-maximizing auctioneer/matchmaker in the Kelso–Crawford (1982) (many-to-one) assignment problem. We consider general and simple (individualized price) message spaces for firmsʼ reports following Milgrom (2010). We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049796