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Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 89 (2015) C, pp. 17-33
In the basic adverse selection model, a seller makes a contract offer to a privately informed buyer. A fundamental …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190612
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Overconfidence and moral hazard
la Rosa, Leonidas Enrique de - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 429-451
overconfidence can have conflicting effects on the equilibrium contract. On the one hand, an optimistic or overconfident agent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573644
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The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case
Silvers, Randy - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 352-365
the agentʼs action to the outcome — is observed before the contract is offered. The signal is either uninformative (null … information, there exists a contract with public information that both strictly prefer. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049676
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Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
Kadan, Ohad; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 468-489
, induced effort (and hence productivity) falls. We also study how the cost minimizing contract for any given effort level …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049704
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Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
Auster, Sarah - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 503-521
This paper introduces asymmetric awareness into the classical principal–agent model and discusses the optimal contract … proposing a contract and faces a tradeoff between participation and incentives. Leaving the agent unaware allows the principal … incentive constraint. The optimal contract reveals contingencies that have low probability but are highly informative about the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049755
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Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts
Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 145-164
We study the length of agreements in a market in which infinitely-lived firms contract with agents that live for two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049866
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Wealth effects and agency costs
Chade, Hector; Vera de Serio, Virginia N. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 1-11
We analyze how the agent's initial wealth affects the principal's expected profits in the standard principal–agent model with moral hazard.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785193
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Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules
Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Turocy, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 224-238
of a contest. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931195
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The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
Ryvkin, Dmitry - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 564-572
perspective of a contest organizer whose objective is to maximize aggregate effort, it is optimal to sort players in a way that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573651
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Coalitional stochastic stability
Newton, Jonathan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 842-854
This paper takes the idea of coalitional behavior – groups of people occasionally acting together to their mutual benefit – and incorporates it into the framework of evolutionary game theory that underpins the social learning literature. An equilibrium selection criterion is defined which we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577245