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We propose an equilibrium model of duopolistic dynamic pricing in which a buyer alternates between two sellers for price offers over a finite time horizon. The game ends when the buyer accepts a price offer or the selling season is over, whichever comes first. Previous research (Granot et al.,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049745
We study a sealed-bid auction between two bidders with asymmetric independent private values. The two bidders own asymmetric shares in a partnership. The higher bidder buys the lower bidderʼs shares at a per-unit price that is a convex combination of the two bids. The weight of the lower bid is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049794
We present a model of two-sided matching where utility is non-transferable and information about individualsʼ skills is private, utilities are strictly increasing in the partnerʼs skill and satisfy increasing differences. Skills can be either revealed or kept hidden, but while agents on one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049892
We characterize the surplus-maximizing trading mechanism under two-sided incomplete information and interim individual rationality, when one party can make a value-enhancing specific investment. This mechanism exhibits a trade-off between providing investment incentives and inducing voluntary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573643
Cake cutting is a common metaphor for the division of a heterogeneous divisible good. There are numerous papers that study the problem of fairly dividing a cake; a small number of them also take into account self-interested agents and consequent strategic issues, but these papers focus on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603337
We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state as the noise in the senders' observations gets small. In the case of replacement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117135
In an individual experimentation problem a decision maker learns only from his own experience. It is well known that an optimal experimentation strategy for such problems sometimes results in the best alternative being dropped altogether, which is the so-called “Rothschild effect.” Many...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049690
We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into contiguous cells. We give a full characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049703
Infinite hierarchies of awareness and beliefs arise in games with unawareness, similarly to belief hierarchies in standard games. A natural question is whether each hierarchy describes the playerʼs awareness of the hierarchies of other players and beliefs over these, or whether the reasoning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049778
We report findings from experiments on two delegation–communication games. An uninformed principal chooses whether to fully delegate her decision-making authority to an informed agent or to retain the authority and communicate with the agent via cheap talk to obtain decision-relevant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049784