Showing 1 - 10 of 194
We study a refinement of correlated equilibrium in which playersʼ actions are driven by their beliefs and higher order … without a common prior, and up to any a priori fixed depth of reasoning. In every finite game “most” correlated equilibrium … equilibrium distributions based on the maximum order of beliefs used by players in the equilibrium. On the other hand, in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049823
We present evidence from laboratory experiments of behavioral spillovers and cognitive load that spread across strategic contexts. In the experiments, subjects play two distinct games simultaneously with different opponents. We find that the strategies chosen and the efficiency of outcomes in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597542
I analyze how informal agreements can be sustained by moral emotions with regard to a large class of two-player games. Specifically, I assume that people feel guilty if they breach an agreement and that the guilt increases according to the degree of the harm inflicted on the other. A central...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010666018
In a credence goods game with an expert and a consumer, we study experimentally the impact of two devices that are predicted to induce consumer-friendly behavior if the expert has a propensity to feel guilty when he believes that he violates the consumerʼs payoff expectations: (i) an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049695
Punishment typically involves depriving violators of resources they own such as money or labor. These resources can become revenue for authorities and thus motivate profit-seeking punishment. In this paper, we design a novel experiment to provide direct evidence on the role punishment plays in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049700
We advance the measurement of trust in economics in two ways. First, we highlight the importance of clearly identifying the target of trust, particularly for obtaining concordance between attitudinal and behavioral measures of trust. Second, we introduce a novel behavioral measure of (dis)trust,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049788
We propose a methodology that is generalizable to a broad class of repeated games in order to facilitate operability of belief-learning models with repeated-game strategies. The methodology consists of (1) a generalized repeated-game strategy space, (2) a mapping between histories and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049792
In three experiments we examine the extent to which strategic sophistication (i.e., inductive reasoning, iterative dominance and level-k thinking) is determined by broader cognitive skills. In the first experiment we replicate previous results showing strong associations between cognitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049801
This paper studies the evolution of peoplesʼ models of how other people think – their theories of mind. This is formalized within the level-k model, which postulates a hierarchy of types, such that type k plays a k times iterated best response to the uniform distribution. It is found that,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049877
outcomes resemble the symmetric Nash equilibrium. The strategies that survive evolutionary competition achieve much higher …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785198