We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well...

This paper takes the idea of coalitional behavior – groups of people occasionally acting together to their mutual benefit – and incorporates it into the framework of evolutionary game theory that underpins the social learning literature. An equilibrium selection criterion is defined which we...

We consider the “airport problem”, which is concerned with sharing the cost of an airstrip among agents who need airstrips of different lengths. We investigate the implications of two properties, Left-endpoint Subtraction (LS) bilateral consistency and LS converse consistency, in the airport...

This paper considers a resource allocation mechanism that utilizes a profit-maximizing auctioneer/matchmaker in the Kelso–Crawford (1982) (many-to-one) assignment problem. We consider general and simple (individualized price) message spaces for firmsʼ reports following Milgrom (2010). We show...

Sengupta and Sengupta (1996) study the accessibility of the core of a TU game and show that the core, if non-empty, can be reached from any non-core allocation via a finite sequence of successive blocks. This paper complements the result by showing that when the core is empty, a number of...

We study a setting in which imitative players are matched into pairs to play a Prisonerʼs Dilemma game. A well-known result in such setting is that under random matching cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition. The novelty of this paper is that we consider partial rematching:...

The study of coalition formation under uncertainty poses subtle questions regarding the appropriate definition of the core. In this paper a new core concept, the interim sequential core (ISC), is proposed as a solution concept to transferable utility games with uncertainty when binding...

A recent literature in evolutionary game theory is devoted to the question of robust equilibrium selection under noisy best-response dynamics. In this paper we present a complete picture of equilibrium selection for asymmetric binary choice coordination games in the small noise limit. We achieve...

The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It generally has a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. We show that, depending on how we define perturbations – i.e., possible mistakes...

This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking activities in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking game between two groups of different size. We first investigate Nash reversion strategies to...