We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses or best-responses. First, we show that a necessary condition for recurrent implementation in better-response dynamics (BRD) is a small...

In games with incomplete information, more information to a player implies a broader strategy set for this player in the normal form game, hence more knowledge implies more ability. We prove that, conversely, given two normal form games G and G' such that players in a subset J of the set of...

In this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential competitors. Agents may sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt. Reports are unverifiable – cheap...

The aim of this paper is to provide a tractable model where both socialization (or network formation) and productive efforts can be analyzed simultaneously. This permits a full-fledged equilibrium/welfare analysis of network formation with endogenous productive efforts and heterogeneous agents....

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game, that a social choice function that chooses any particular correlated equilibrium distribution does not...